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 I 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Many accident investigation techniques and other methods used by the petroleum industry 
today list a set of underlying human related causes and subsequent improvement suggestions. 
Do these techniques address the root cause behind the problem so that the appropriate 
initiatives can be implemented? The focus of the present thesis was to determine the human 
related root cause of two major accidents in the North Sea. This in order to give 
recommendations to improve the safety levels in the organisation. In order to achieve the 
above-mentioned goals, the IPT Knowledge Model was adapted to the given accidents. The 
data input into the model was based on interpreted observations from former investigation 
reports. The analysis of the blowout on Snorre A and the well control incident on Gullfaks C 
resulted in 49 and 63 observations respectively. For both accidents, the Human Factor that 
was indicated to have the largest affect on the accidents was Training and Competence (29% 
for Snorre A and 19% for Gullfaks C). Lack of competence was indicated as the majority 
subclass. Collectively, management and supervision, or lack thereof, was also indicated as 
being a contributing factor to the accidents. These final results coincide with the findings in 
other investigation reports. However, these are more acute, indicating a specific area of 
improvement within the company. By increasing the competency levels within the company 
and ensuring that the leaders and management have the proper tools to follow-up their 
employees and their operations, the safety levels and safety culture will improve.   
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SAMMENDRAG 
 
Mange ulykkesgranskningsteknikker og metoder som benyttes av petroleumsindustrien idag 
lister et sett med underliggende menneskelige årsaker og påfølgende forslag til forbedringer. 
Har disse teknikkene behandlet roten til årsaken til problemet slik at de riktige tiltakene kan 
iverksettes? Fokuset i denne avhandlingen var å finne den grunnleggende årsaken til to store 
ulykker i Nordsjøen for deretter å gi anbefalinger som kan forbedre sikkerhetsnivået i 
selskapet. For å oppnå de overnevnte målene, ble IPT Kunnskapsmodell utvidet for de gitte 
ulykkene. Tolkede observasjoner fra tilgjengelige granskningsrapporter ble benyttet som et 
grunnlag for analysen. Analysen av utblåsningen på Snorre A og brønnkontroll hendelsen på 
Gullfaks C resulterte i henholdsvis 49 og 63 observasjoner. Opplæring og kompetanse var den 
menneskelige faktoren som ble angitt å ha størst innvirkning på begge ulykker (29% for 
Snorre A og 19% for Gullfaks C). Manglende kompetanse var indikert som den underklassen 
med størst betydning. Sammenlagt var ledelse og styring, eller mangelen på, også indikert 
som en medvirkende faktor til ulykkene. Disse samsvarer med resultatene i andre 
granskningsrapporter. Resultatene her er dog mer tilspisset og gir da et konkret område som 
behøver forbedring.Ved å øke kompetansen blant de ansatte i selskapet og sikre at ledere og 
ledelsen har de riktige verktøyene for å følge opp sine ansatte og operasjoner, kan 
sikkerhetsnivået og sikkerhetskulturen forbedres.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
“To err is human”  (Arnstein 1997) 
 
1.1. MOTIVATION 
 
Many accident investigation reports (Austnes-Underhaug et. al. 2005; Schiefloe et. al. 2005; 
Gundersen et. al. 2010; Talberg et. al. 2010) list a set of both the triggering and underlying 
causes of the accidents. The triggering causes are often of a technical nature, whilst the 
underlying causes relate to aspects of human error. The companys own internal investigation 
reports (Kjeldstad et. al. 2005; Schiefloe et. al. 2005; Talberg et. al. 2010) list, based on the 
causal findings, a set of actions or initiatives to be implemented within both the given 
department and the company in its entirety. Are these causes detailed enough to allow 
efficient implementation of organisational change? Do the methods used today define the root 
cause of an accident in such a manner that sufficient changes can be made to counteract the 
challenge? Or are they too simple in their conclusions resulting in initiatives being 
implemented across the board? 
 
 “Human errors account for all errors and failures in offshore related operations if the chain 
of cause-effect is pursued deeply enough” (Skalle and Busch 2012).  
  
Over time, the industry’s attention has moved from the immediate causes (often human error) 
and over to the challenge relating to organisation and management (Hovden et. al. 
2012). However, the industry lacks consensus of what organisational dimensions that are 
relevant to address (Thunem et. al. 2009).  
    
Technical errors are somehow less complex to deal with than human errors, as they are easier 
to define. However, the release of technical errors is largely influenced by organisational 
culture and human errors. By understanding which human errors have the largest effect on 
mistakes, slips and lapses, management is able to concentrate their attention on the correct 
organisational change instead of implementing initiatives across the board. 
  
After the ballast tank on Floatel Superior, 7 November 2012, in the Njord field in the North 
Sea, was damaged causing the installation to list, many professionals have released to the 
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media their concern with how the Norwegian Petroleum Safety Authority (PSA) and the oil 
industry work with Quality, Health, Safety and Environment (Q-HSE). The listing of Floatel 
Superior happened only months after the same incident occurred on Scarabeo 8 in the Barents 
Sea. The industry is challenged by the ability to learn from previous mistakes. 
  
The environmental organisation, Bellona, stated to Aftenposten on 7 November 2012 
(Kvilesjø and Seglem 2012) that what happened in early morning on 7 November, should not 
have happen. It is likely that there have been violations of regulations. Either the owner or the 
operator has been inattentive or the Norwegian supervisory system grants dispensations too 
easily, which should never have been granted. Bellona has been working actively to ensure 
that PSA intensify its supervisory activities on the Norwegian Continental Shelf, they fear that 
an organisational culture of granting dispensations has evolved from the Norwegian 
government. 
   
Bellona continues to state that the accident potential for offshore Norway is too large. With 
better investigation techniques the industry may be able to change the negative trend in a 
positive direction. Any written rules, regulations or plans can best be evaluated when an 
accident occurs; learning from previous mistakes can lead to updated and more reliable 
versions. The weaknesses are then detected, sufficient countermeasures issued and the new 
realisation can be entered into existing documents, which can then be revised and updated. 
 
 
1.2. GOALS 
 
The goal of present thesis is two-fold:  
 
1. Determine which Human Factor has had the largest influence on the two accidents 
within the company. The root cause is defined as the highest concentration of 
weighted relationships between observations and potential errors / failures 
2. Improve safety levels in the organisation during drilling operations, based on findings 
in goal one.  
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1.3. APPROACH 
 
The present thesis is presented in cooperation with NTNU and Statoil ASA (later referred to 
as Statoil) regarding Human Factors effect on their accidents. Throughout the Specialisation 
Project titled Human Aspects in Major Accidents (Hernæs 2012), basic knowledge was gained 
as to the importance of managing human error. The present thesis builds on this knowledge 
resulting in a more comprehensive analysis. The analysis and results presented by Hernæs 
(2012) was a simplified version of the one completed here, making those results less reliable.  
 
The accident investigation models applied by the petroleum industry in Norway today are 
assessed according to the goals of the present thesis and a model is chosen for application. 
One example of accident investigation modelling is the Knowledge Model developed at the 
Department of Petroleum Engineering and Applied Geophysics at NTNU.  
 
This model is further developed and fine-tuned according to the findings made during the 
specialisation project. The goal of the model development is to create a more conclusive and 
comprehensive model, thus resulting in more reliable conclusions.  
 
The analysis phase will evaluate two accidents, the blowout on Snorre A in 2004 and the well 
control incident on Gullfaks C in 2010. The scope of the present thesis limits the field data to 
accident investigation reports, both internally in Statoil and externally by PSA and the 
International Research Institute in Stavanger (IRIS). These findings will allow us to conclude 
with what Human Factor had the largest effect on the accidents, separately as well as 
combined. When completing this analysis, it will be possible to conclude with which Human 
Factor has the largest affect on how the company operates.   
 
Based on the results, suggestions will be made in order to improve the safety levels within the 
organisation in order to prevent or minimize the effect of the next major accident.  
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2. EXISTING MODELS FOR ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION 
 
This chapter presents examples of accident investigation models that are applied by the 
industry today. Table 3 in chapter 2.3 lists what company applies the different models in their 
accident investigations. This is presented to give the reader an introduction to state of the art 
accident investigation techniques and a broader perspective of the challenges.  
2.1. INTRODUCTION TO ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION 
 
NORSOK (2001) defines an accident as an acute unwanted and unplanned event or chain of 
events resulting in loss of lives or injury to health, environment or financial values. Another 
way of putting it is energy gone astray (Hovden et. al. 2012). What differentiates two 
accidents is primarily the type and amount of energy astray.  
 
Hovden et. al. (2012) exemplifies this by comparing that of a little girl climbing a tree and 
falling down to the Chernobyl disaster in 1986. Inadequate education and training to master 
the task both for the operator in Chernobyl and the girl in the tree, failure of management- and 
control systems (the girls parents have been negligent, in the same way as the management of 
the nuclear power plant and the government in Moscow), barrier failure, experimentation, 
testing of boundaries for behaviour/operations and more.  
 
The knowledge of accidents is important in order to operate with efficient risk management 
and preventative work. In order to increase the knowledge of accidents, they must be 
investigated. Accident investigation models aim to simplify complex events to something 
tangible and understandable. This maintains the most significant characteristics of an 
accident, what is unique and what it has in common with other accidents.  
 
Sklet (2002) defines the purpose of accident investigation as:  
  
1. Identify and describe the true chain of events 
2. Identify the direct cause of the accident 
3. Identify risk reducing measures to prevent similar accidents/incidents in the future 
4. Identify need for prosecution 
5. Evaluate the question of guilt and responsibility in relation to liability 
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The present thesis focuses on issues 1.–3. as they are the most relevant based on the goals 
presented in chapter 1.2. By completing 1. and 2. the root cause of the two accidents can be 
defined. 3. allows us to work towards our goal of improving safety levels in the organisation. 
The responsibility of identifying the need for prosecution and liability lies in the hands of 
government agencies or the company itself and will not be addressed here.  
 
In order to achieve the purpose of accident investigation, a set of procedures need to be 
implemented. Figure 1 shows Cacciabue´s (2004) guideline to accident investigation. This 
process has been simplified according to the scope of the present thesis. Originally there were 
7 steps, but two steps have been eliminated [select models of organisation and Human 
Machine Interaction (HMI) and evaluate organisation by ethnographic studies and Cognitive 
Task Analysis (CTA)]. This is because they are considered too complex compared to the 
goals of the present thesis. The goal of finding the root cause does not require multiple 
models or an ethnographic study into the specific culture.  
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Figure 1 - Stepwise procedure for accident investigation (redrawn from Cacciabue 2004) 
Cacciabue (2004) differentiates between accident investigation/analysis and root cause 
analysis (RCA). RCA does not solely investigate the accident in question but also previous 
events leading up to the accident. Consequently, it focuses more on the evaluation of cause 
and effect of the specific incident. 
 
Related to Human Factors (HF) evaluation of the reasons and causes behind a single 
inappropriate performance or error constitutes the RCA of an event. Any irregularity 
regarding human behaviour is addressed when taking HFs into account through accident 
investigation.  
 
One of the challenges for accident investigation models is the difficulty of including the 
complexity and dynamics of the organisation into the model (Thunem et. al. 2009). There are 
a number of available accident investigation models that include organisational factors in their 
analysis, a selection of them are presented in chapter 2.2. 
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2.2. MODELS 
 
The challenge with finding good models is the balance between models that are too simple 
and merely conclude with the obvious result and models that are too complex for practicality 
(Thunem et. al. 2009). The accidents have been selected and data collected (presented in 
chapter 4), in order to complete step 3: Select model for accident analysis. Six models are 
presented below used in accident investigation in technical industries. Based on the 
information given below the model of best fit regarding the scope of the present thesis will be 
accepted. There are several criteria for accepting a model to apply in the present thesis, the 
main criteria are:  
 
 That the results determine the root human error 
 That the model has not previously been applied to the accidents in question 
 That there is limited necessity for training and education 
 That the model does not require software 
 
A comparison of the models based on the list above can be found in Table 4 in chapter 2.4.  
 
Tinnmannsvik et. al. (2004) has summarized these models, other references used are 
accredited in each sub-chapter.  
 
2.2.1. Man-Technology-Organisation 
 
The idea behind Man-Technology-Organisation (MTO) analysis is that the human, 
technological and organisational factors are given equal attention during accident 
investigation. MTO analysis is based on what is internationally known as Human 
Performance Evaluation System (HPES).  
 
MTO-analysis is executed based on the following four methods (Holmefjord and Nielsen 
2002): 
  
1. Perform a structured analysis using an event- and cause-diagram. 
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2. Perform a change analysis by characterizing how the events of the given 
incident/accident deviated from standard/normal practice. 
3. Perform a barrier analysis by identifying what technical, human or organisational 
barriers have been lacking or broken.  
4. Identify the cause of the incident/accident, including any relevant MTO factors.  
 
A barrier is defined as all the organisational, operational and administrative protections 
(Holmefjord and Nielsen 2002) available in the organisation and/or a specific workplace to 
prevent or limit consequences of mistakes and erroneous actions. Examples are regulations, 
safety systems and procedures (Tinmannsvik et.al. 2004). 
 
The MTO-analysis worksheet is shown in Figure 2.  Based on the four methods presented 
above an MTO-analysis is performed by completing the following four steps (Tinmannsvik 
et. al. 2004):  
 
1. The event sequence is developed longitudinally and illustrated in a block diagram. 
Possible technical and human related causes of each event should be identified and 
drawn, connected vertically to its coinciding event.  
2. A change analysis is made by distinguishing between normal situations and 
deviations, these are drawn in vertically above the causes in the worksheet.  
3. An analysis of the failed or missing barriers is completed and illustrated below the 
chain of events.  
4. Realistic and specific recommendations regarding technical, human and organisational 
factors are presented based on the findings throughout this analysis.  
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Figure 2 - MTO-analysis worksheet (Tinmannsvik et. al. 2004) 
 
A checklist is used in order to identify underlying causes of failed or missing barriers, the key 
points are (Tinmannsvik et. al 2004):  
 
 Work environment 
 Work organisation 
 Routines regarding change operations 
 Company management/Platform organisation 
 Ergonomics – inadequate technique 
 Shift work 
 Communication 
 Written instruction 
 Work management 
 Common practice/individuals 
 Training and competence 
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The main goal of MTO analysis is to keep the operators focused on preventing the next 
accident. Causes must be identified to such an extent that it is possible to implement effective 
preventative measures (Holmefjord and Nielsen 2002).  
 
2.2.2. TRIPOD 
 
The main principal behind the TRIPOD concept is that the primary cause of accidents is 
organisational failure. Organisational failure is a latent error and as a contributor to accidents 
it is followed by numerous technical and human errors.  
 
The TRIPOD model is shown in Figure 3. 
 
 
Figure 3 - TRIPOD model (Tinmannsvik et. al. 2004) 
Acts and situations of a substandard nature are developed by mechanisms in an organisation, 
they do not just occur. The underlying mechanisms, often from decisions made higher up in 
the organisation, are referred to as Basic Risk Factors (BRF). BRFs may lead to substandard 
activities by generating differing psychological precursors. Psychological precursors may be 
exemplified in the form of slips, lapses and violations due to pressure regarding time, poorly 
motivated workers or depression.  By eliminating or reducing the consequences of latent 
errors, psychological precursors will be prevented thus resulting in accident prevention.  
 
Table 1 shows the 11 BRFs used in this model. These cover technical, human and 
organisational issues. BRF 1-5 are specific BRFs, whilst 6-10 are generic, all of these being 
preventive BRFs. BRF 11 is a mitigation BRF and refers to controlling the effect of an 
operational disturbance once it has occurred.  
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Table 1 - Definition of BRFs in TRIPOD (Tinmannsvik et. al. 2004) 
 
 
2.2.3. Safety through Organisational Learning 
 
Safety through Organisational Learning (SOL) uses standardised steps in order to develop 
event analysis. It is a system used to learn from previous events in order to prevent future 
ones, adopted from the German and Swiss nuclear industry (Becker unknown year). Three 
guidelines are used to support the event analysis:  
 
1. Description of situation 
 
As soon as an event has occurred, it should be described by breaking it down into a chain of 
events. This means that the event is broken down into single actions with different actors 
(person or object involved). This stage is solely to create event building blocks as a basis for 
future analysis and no causes or contributing factors should be acknowledged here. This 
process is similar to the STEP model.  
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The goal of Sequentially Timed Event Plotting (STEP) was developed in order to give a 
realistic description of the chain of events, not focusing on the cause. The goal of the method 
is two-fold; graphic portrayal of the chain of events and identify and consider necessary 
actions. Chain of events is presented by a time axis (x-axis at top) and an actor axis (y-axis 
down) as shown in Figure 4. The actor is any person or object/machine involved in the 
accident. Safety issues are then identified, followed by reasoned recommendations of 
initiatives to be implemented.  
 
Figure 4 - STEP worksheet (Tinmannsvik et. al. 2004) 
 
 
STEP is constructed of four concepts:   
1. Several activities occur simultaneously. This means that neither the incident nor the 
following investigation consists of one chain of events, but many.  
2. The Building Block format is used to display the accident description. One building 
block equals one event.  
3. Events are displayed and flow logically in the worksheet. Arrows illustrate flow.  
4. Processes regarding production and accidents are similar and can therefore be 
investigated similarly. Both involve actions with coinciding actors and may be 
repeated, once understanding is in place.  
 
When applying the SOL model, a sequence of single actions by differing actors between start 
and finish determine the accidental event. The start of an accidental event is defined by an 
alarm or perception of a deviation/discrepancy from acceptable course of action. The finish 
point or end of an accidental event is when all systems are back on track in a safe system 
state.  
 
 
 13 
2. Identifying contributing factors (CF) 
 
This guideline features the next step in the analysis, when every action has a corresponding 
actor in the building block. In this step every action is analysed and questions regarding why 
it occurred are brought up. The building block is here completed by identifying and adding 
CFs that can be complemented by adding more CFs. The five subsystems related to CFs are 
shown in Figure 5. Now, a graphical representation of sequence of events and all contributing 
factors is presented in its entirety and complexity.  
 
 
Figure 5 - Socio-technical system model of event genesis (Tinmannsvik et. al. 2004) 
 
This model differentiates between direct and indirect CFs. Examples of direct CFs are 
information, communication and working conditions whilst indirect CFs may be exemplified 
as operation scheduling, responsibility and control and supervision.  
 
The comprehensiveness of the analysis is ensured by general questions in the aid relating to 
possible CFs. I.e. contributing factor working conditions has the corresponding general 
question “Could operator performance been influenced by the working conditions at the time 
of the event?” 
 
3. Reporting  
This guideline is not described further in the present thesis as the system for reporting is not 
relevant for the process used in analysing the accident.  
 
These three guidelines ensure a standardised process without preventing mobilization of 
expertise and creativity. 
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2.2.4. Management Oversight Risk Tree 
 
Management Oversight Risk Tree (MORT) allows for a systematic approach to a 
comprehensive accident investigation. Investigators can, by using MORT, identify 
discrepancies and/or deficiencies of specific control or management system factors 
(Tinmannsvik et. al. 2004). Identifying and evaluating these deficiencies can identify the 
causal factors of the accident. MORT is an analytical process that determines causes and CFs 
of incidents/accidents (ICMA 2011).  
 
The basis for MORT analysis is a graphical checklist designed to answer generic questions 
using the information available. It requires extensive training of the investigators in order for 
them to have the high level of competency required to execute such an analysis. The analysis 
starts with choosing which MORT form to use, depending on the safety program being 
analysed (Tinmannsvik et. al. 2004). The investigators work their way down the tree, level by 
level, and when a sufficient part of the tree has been analysed the cause and effect may easily 
be traced. The tree highlights which areas need auditing and actions to prevent a similar 
accident.  
 
MORT defines accidents as unplanned events resulting in losses, i.e. producing harm (ICMA 
2011). These losses arise in the interface between a person/asset and a harmful agent. MORT 
differentiates between causal types; failure of prevention or an acceptable, yet unfortunate, 
result of a risk well analysed and compensated for, namely an assumed risk. The failure of 
prevention is always analysed prior to deliberating the assumed risks.   
 
Firstly, key episodes are identified, in order to do so a barrier analysis is performed in order to 
focus the analysis. International Crisis Management Association (ICMA) recommends that 
MORT analysis only be used when completing it will add value to investigation (ICMA 
2011). In order to perform such analysis, the investigator must be familiar with the system 
and have performed accident investigation using this method at least once before. This 
recommendation is presented in order for the investigator to be able to be in such a position 
that he/she can make sound judgements.  
 
MORT analysis is a time consuming and costly process and is mainly used for the highest 
risks or operation critical activities. 
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2.2.5. Root Cause Analysis 
 
Information regarding RCA is obtained from Sklet (2002).  
 
Root Cause Analysis (RCA) identifies the underlying faults in a companys safety 
management system. When these faults or deficiencies are corrected the same or a similar 
incident will be prevented.  
 
RCA is executed by using the results found from the previous presented models and from this 
find the largest contributing factor to the accident. The other models provide an answer to the 
questions of what, when, who, where and how and RCA takes this and answers the question 
of why, finding one reason. This form of analysis requires judgement and comprehension.   
 
 
2.2.6. IPT Knowledge Model 
 
Information presented below is obtained from Skalle and Busch (2012), Skalle (2012) and 
Hernæs (2012). 
 
As per October 2012 the IPT Knowledge Model (KM) includes 9 different themes for 
analysis. These include human error, technical error, drilling parameter and so on. As the 
scope of the present thesis focuses on finding the human related root cause, the rest of the 
model is presented here solely based on the theme human error.  
 
To initiate the analysis, all information available related to the accident must be made 
available. Now steps 1-3 of the stepwise procedure for accident investigation is completed 
(Figure 1, Chapter 2.1) and step 4: Analyse data and define accident causes, can be initiated.  
 
The first step is to list all observations. An observation can be defined as any discrepancy, 
deficiency, non-compliance or similar present during planning and execution of the operation.  
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Examples of observations may be:  
 
1. “Risk register did not reflect the risk analyses and discussions in the planning 
group.”1 
2. “Drilling contractor not involved in planning of operations”2 
 
These are both examples of unwanted behaviour from involved personnel. No observation is 
too small or insignificant; any aspect of the operation that is not ideal should be registered as 
an observation. Later the effect the different observations have on an accident will be seen.  
 
When all observations are registered they must be translated into symbolic concepts. A 
symbolic concept is a short sentence, which simplifies the observation into its essence. The 
circumstances are eliminated and the actual error is left. This makes the assignment easier for 
the investigator. Each observation may have more than one symbolic concept.  
 
Examples of symbolic concepts (continuing from example above):  
 
1. “Inadequate documentation.” 
2. “Inadequate use of essential resources in planning.” 
 
The symbolic concepts are then set in relation to a predetermined list of subclasses of HF and 
thus set in relation to a given HF. As for observations having more than one symbolic 
concept, the symbolic concept can be set in relation to several subclasses.  
 
Throughout the process from observation to HF the numerical relationships must be analysed. 
There is no relation between observation and symbolic concept as these are rewritten versions 
of the first and the relation would therefore be 1.0. Subclasses are defined to have relation 
strength 0.9. The other relationships are based on the values given in Table 2.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1
 Observation made from the well control incident on GFC 
2
 Observation made from the blowout on SNA 
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Table 2 - Relations and numerical values (free after Skalle 2012) 
Relation Numerical value 
Causes always 1.0 
Causes (typically) 0.9 
Leads to 0.8 
Implies 0.7 
Causes sometimes 0.6 
Enables 0.5 
Reduces effect of 0.5 
Involves 0.5 
Indicates 0.4 
Causes occasionally 0.3 
 
 
These relations result in a path strength. The path strength results in the value of the given 
observation using the equation (1). 
 
              ∏                   
 
   
 
(1) 
 
After calculating the path strengths, the explanation strength can, by using equation (2), be 
found.  
 
                      ∑               
 
   
 
(2) 
 
Here, m equals the number of paths relating the given HF. The HF with the highest 
explanation strength is the one that has had the greatest effect on the incident.  
 
This model is a dynamic model, which means that when an accident is exposed to evaluation, 
all new, involved concepts have to be merged into existing model. This process is referred to 
as Bottom-Up Modelling, as opposed to Top-Down Modelling. Top Down modelling is based 
on general knowledge typically found in textbooks. The new concepts and adaptations of the 
model as a result of the present thesis are presented in Chapter 3.2. 
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2.3. WHO USES WHICH MODEL? 
 
After Tinmannsvik et. al. (2004) a list of Norwegian operator companys internal accident 
investigation methods is presented in Table 3, with reservations that this may have changed 
since 2004.  
 
Table 3 - Operator internal investigation methods (free after Tinmannsvik et. al. (2004)) 
Operator Investigative model 
British Petroleum Root cause 
ConocoPhillips TapRoot
3
 
Esso TapRoot 
Shell Tripod Beta
4
 
Statoil MTO, STEP 
Talisman Root Cause 
Total ILSI model/MTO methodology with barrier 
failure 
 
2.4. COMPARISON 
 
The previous subchapter gave an overview of six models available today regarding the 
assessment of human and organisational factors in accident investigation. The six models 
were chosen because they address the organisational factors and have the ability to conclude 
with the relationship between the accident and the organisation. Table 4 compares the models 
in relation to their characteristics; their positive and negative characteristics based on the 
scope of the present thesis. The second column lists the training necessary to apply the given 
model. Expert refers to the need for formal training prior to applying the model in its proper 
form; experience with the application of the model is beneficial (Sklet 2002). A novice is 
someone who is able to apply the model without hands-on training or experience. A specialist 
falls somewhere between these two categories.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
3
 Software for Root Cause Analysis 
4
 Software used for the TRIPOD model 
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Table 4 – Comparison of accident investigation models based on criteria. Training column derived from Sklet (2002). 
Advantages and limitations are from the present thesis based on the criteria for accident selection. 
Model Training Advantages Limitations 
MTO Expert Comprehensive analysis, 
takes all aspects into 
account, defines the root 
cause. 
No software necessary. 
Main model used by Statoil 
in their accident 
investigations. 
Expert training and 
experience necessary. 
TRIPOD Specialist Defines the underlying 
organisational cause. 
Not previously applied to 
the accidents.  
Software necessary to 
complete the analysis.  
Specialist training 
necessary. 
SOL/STEP Novice Sequential analysis, 
graphical representation of 
results.  
Can be applied with limited 
training and experience.  
Not previously applied.  
No software necessary.  
 
MORT Expert Identifies discrepancies with 
management system factors.  
Not previously applied.  
 
Expert training and 
experience necessary.  
Time consuming and costly 
process. (software 
necessary) 
RCA Specialist Determines the underlying 
faults in the company’s 
safety management system. 
Specialist training 
necessary. 
Supplementary model, may 
not be used on its own. 
IPT KM Novice Highlights root cause using 
logical groupings of 
observations. May be used 
on its own or in 
collaboration with other 
models. 
Limited training and 
experience necessary. 
No software needed. 
Model is still under 
development, this may 
affect the results.  
 
 
Chapter 3 addresses the comparison in Table 4 and the information given above in order to 
select a model for analysis which best fits the criteria listed in the introduction to chapter 2.2.  
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3. SELECTED METHODOLOGY 
 
The investigatiion model to be used in the analysis of the chosen accidents is the IPT 
Knowledge Model (KM). The model has been adapted based on the work done in the present 
thesis. The adaptations are presented in this chapter.  
 
3.1. JUSTIFICATION OF CHOICE 
 
The comparison between the different accident investigation models completed in Table 4, 
shows that SOL/STEP and the IPT KM satisfy the criteria from Chapter 2.2. The other 
models need either expert or specialist experience, the investigator here has neither. MTO has 
already been applied and thus this model is eliminated. If the decision was only based on the 
four criteria, the obvious choice would be SOL/STEP, but based on Thunem et. al.’s (2009) 
statements portrayed throughout the previous chapters relating to the challenges of accident 
investigation models not taking into account the complexity and dynamics of an organisation 
and also the characteristics of models being either too simple or too complex, the IPT KM is a 
clear choice. This is because the IPT KM is a bottom-up form of modelling which is dynamic 
in nature and constantly under development, when the model adapts according to the 
situation. Whether the model is too simple or too complex is at the moment challenging to 
determine because it has only been applied to a limited number of accidents, but by applying 
the model here and fine-tuning it, it may result in a model that is just the right amount of 
simplicity and complexity.  
 
3.2. ADAPTATION OF MODEL 
 
In Skalle and Busch (2012) work they refer to organisational indicators. The candidate 
believes that the term Human Factor is more preferential as this is a well-established term 
used in organisational psychology and accident investigation. HF is defined as (HSE 2012):   
 
"…environmental, organisational and job factors, and human and individual characteristics, 
which influence behaviour at work in a way which can affect health and safety"  
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Human error consists of three types of behaviour: Intentional behaviour, non-intentional 
behaviour and unintentional behaviour. The focus here will be on unintentional behaviour 
excluding violations and spontaneous actions.  
 
Humans show three types of behaviour when executing tasks, skill based, rule based and 
knowledge based (Human factors briefing note no. 12 2012). The three types of behaviour 
refer to the level of consciousness we contribute to the task at hand. Skill based error refers to 
slips and lapses while executing routine and simple tasks errors (Reason 1990). Rule based 
error refers to mistakes made in execution as a result of forgetting a step in an operation or 
applying the wrong rule to the given situation. Knowledge based errors are mistakes made as 
a result of inaccurate conclusions or incomplete analysis based on the information available.  
Each HF can be related to one or more of these error behaviour types as shown in Figure 6. 
 
 
Figure 6 – Relation between behavioural error and HF (free after Skalle 2012) 
 
The eight HFs shown in Figure 6 are from Skalle (2012), but as this model is bottom-up 
modelling and open to adaptation, one new HF has been introduced to the model, 
management and supervision. Safety critical communication, fatigue and workload and 
maintenance, inspection and training have been re-defined. The explanations can be seen 
below.  Now there are nine HFs, they are briefly described below and their corresponding 
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subclasses are presented in Table 5, this can give the reader a better understanding of what is 
meant by each HF. These are:  
 
1. Procedures 
 
Procedures relate to governing documents and systems set in play in the organisation that 
relate to how a certain activity should be executed in order to ensure reliability and quality of 
product. Compliance with governing documents is not included here. Procedures merely 
include the procedure or steering document itself, is it good enough, simply explained, easy to 
find etcetera.  
 
2. Maintenance Error 
 
Maintenance is a human task, both evaluating the need for maintenance as well as executing 
the job itself. Poor or incorrect maintenance is therefore dependent on the ability and 
performance of maintenance personnel and may have consequences related to human and 
operational safety. This HF does not include the actual maintenance procedures, they are 
implemented in HF 1 above, but it refers to task analysis, and the ability to see the 
maintenance challenge and define the correct course of action to fix it.  
 
3. Organisational Culture 
 
Personal and team related values, attitudes and behaviour all result in a certain organisational 
culture. This is a human factor, which is not easily assessed or altered. The culture has to 
come from management and slowly but surely be implemented in how the company does their 
job.  
 
The hearts and minds culture ladder in Figure 7 shows how the safety culture of an 
organisation changes from pathological to generative; it is at generative that an organisation 
should strive to be.  
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Figure 7 - Hearts and Minds culture ladder (Energy Institute UK microsites 2012) 
A company needs to have good governing systems set in play that the employees support and 
trust. Including the employees in this process will increase their affiliation and compliance 
with the system.  
 
4. Organisational Change 
 
Organisational change is any alteration to the way employees perform their work, including 
down-sizing, restructuring teams or changing administrative arrangements. Organisational 
change may shed light on other challenges within the company that management was not 
previously aware of. Changing an organisation can cause a variety of challenges that had not 
been foreseen due to inadequate change processes and lack of assessment regarding the 
consequences of change.  
 
5. Design Error 
 
Design error is error related to the setup of, for example, a control room or alarm handling. 
The design of a system should take into consideration the fact that people will be operating 
them in order to maintain the safety, efficiency and operability of the system. Design error 
also includes the design of the operation; detailed operations plans.  
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6. Management and Supervision 
 
This HF is not presented as its own organisational indicator in the KM presented by Skalle 
and Busch (2012), but merely as a subclass of fatigue (management related fatigue factors). 
Management is related to handling, direction or control and is an important part of the safety 
work within an organisation. Without sufficient and competent management, the company 
will not be able to reach the goals that have been set or implement organisational changes. 
Supervision is necessary for a company to identify where improvements need to be made, 
which training is necessary and to make sure that their employees have the necessary 
information to comply with regulations and governing documents.  With this justification 
management and supervision has been applied here as its own factor.  
 
7. Training and Competence 
 
In order to assure that one’s employees have the necessary knowledge and information to 
perform their job in a safe and reliable manner, training and elevation of competence is key. 
Training refers to a tool used by management to ensure that their employees have the 
necessary knowledge and attitudes to perform their job. Competence does not only include an 
employees ability to perform their day-to-day tasks, but also the ability to identify risks and 
potential hazards, which could result in incidents or worst case, major accidents. The 
identification of risks and hazards allows the employee to stop operation if it is deemed 
unsafe, thus reducing the potential effects. 
 
8. Communication  
 
Any form of interaction between a human and an interface, for example human to human or 
human to machine, is communication. Communication creates the foundation for anything 
that a human does. The lack of efficient communication methods is an accident risk as a result 
of inaccurate or lacking information. In order for a worker to execute a task they must be 
aware of what is expected of them and have the necessary competence to complete the task. 
The model presented by Skalle and Busch (2012) uses Safety Critical Communication as an 
organisational indicator, however, any form of communication, whether for safety critical 
purposes or others is important and therefore this HF encompasses all forms of 
communication within an operation.  
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9. Fatigue 
 
Fatigue is defined as impaired human reliability, both physical and mental. A fatigued worker 
is more likely to make skill-based errors.  
 
The KM includes a list of symbolic concepts related to the different HF, these are presented in 
Table 5. The subclasses of HF highlighted in green are the ones implemented as a result of the 
analysis completed in the present thesis, these were not included in the original model by 
Skalle and Busch (2012).  
 
Table 5- Human Factors and respective subclasses. HF and subclasses highlighted in green are implemented as a 
result of the analysis completed in the present thesis. 
HUMAN FACTOR SUBCLASSES OF HF 
Procedures Inadequate planning procedure 
Inadequate engineering procedure 
Inadequate safety procedure 
Inadequate reporting procedure 
Maintenance Error Inadequate maintenance 
Inspection error 
Inadequate maintenance risk analysis 
Unrealistic maintenance task 
Organisational Culture Safety culture 
Guiding safety principle 
Inflexible organisation 
Organisational Change Inadequate change process 
Integrating HF (Safety Management System) 
Inadequate evaluation of change 
Design Error Planning error 
Equipment design error 
Labelling error 
Management and Leadership Lack of management prioritization 
Inadequate auditing 
Inadequate follow-up of operations 
Inadequate resource management 
Training and Competence Lack of competence 
Lack of procedural training 
Inadequate task analysis 
Communication Poor quality of information 
Poor quality of communication 
Inadequate application of information 
Fatigue External fatigue factors 
Personal fatigue factors 
The KM is applied to two selected major accidents in the North Sea. Chapter 4 addresses 
them.   
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4. SELECTED ACCIDENTS 
 
The criterion for selecting the accidents was that they occurred within the past 10 years. The 
time frame is due to the data and information available. Also, to best evaluate how to improve 
safety levels, evaluation must to be completed based on the situation today and not 20-30 
years ago. When investigating accidents in the past 10 years, two accidents distinguished 
themselves as major accidents in the North Sea, the blowout on SNA in 2004 and the well 
control incident on GFC in 2010.   
 
The data collection prior to the analysis is limited to investigation reports from Statoil, PSA 
and IRIS. Chapter 4.1 and 4.2 explain which reports have been used for each accident.  
 
In the following subchapters, the accidents are summarized, including a list of causes 
determined in the reports. The entire sequence of events for each accident is available in the 
appendices along with the observations. The observations are interpreted for the purpose of 
the analysis based on the information given in the reports. The candidates own interpretations 
of this information, i.e. the observations, give the field data that is used to analyse the 
accidents and the result. The analysis is further presented in Chapter 5. Statoil implemented a 
number of initiatives after each accident; these are presented at the end of each subchapter. 
These initiatives are included in order to compare them to the results presented in Chapter 6. 
 
4.1. BLOWOUT ON SNA 
 
 
18 November 2004, whilst preparing to sidetrack well P-31 A on the Snorre A (SNA) 
platform, an uncontrolled well situation arose. The work being executed when situation 
occurred was pulling of pipe. During the course of the day the situation developed to an 
uncontrollable blowout of gas to seabed with consequent gas under the offshore installation. 
Due to the presence of gas below the installation (the sea was observed to be boiling) the 
work to secure the well barriers and gain control of the situation was very difficult; supply 
vessels were prevented from approaching the installation in order to, for example, load extra 
mud. Mud was pumped into the well after mixing the chemicals available on board on the 19 
November 2004 and the well stabilized. Now, that the well was stabilized and the flow of gas 
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ceased, the work to secure the well and establish necessary barriers could commence 
(Austnes-Underhaug et. al. 2005).  
 
The blowout resulted in 100 – 200 m3 of OBM released to sea, more than 10 kg/s of gas 
leakages, material damage and other economic losses of over 50 MNOK and subsequent 
production loss of more than 50 MNOK/day (Kjeldstad et. al. 2005).  
 
The incident is explained in its entirety in Appendix A.  
 
Kjeldstad et. al. (2005) identifies four triggering causes of the blowout: 
 
1. Well opened to communication with reservoir when perforating tail pipe in lower 
completion. 
2. Hydrocarbons, gas, were sucked into the well while pulling 7 5/8” casing.  
3. The well had holes in the 9 5/8” casing and external 13 3/8” casing which may have 
suffered reduced strength as a result of drilling of two side tracks or erosion at the 
same time as the 9 5/8” casing eroded.  
4. The technical state of the well made the operation of maintaining control of the well 
volume and analysis of changes very difficult.  
 
They also present in their report three underlying causes of the blowout:  
 
1. Consequences of alterations in plans were not sufficiently analysed with regards to 
risks or understood. 
2. The complexity of the well and risks involved were underestimated.  
3. The organisation has shown inadequate understanding for the necessity of risk 
analysis and management.  
 
 
 
49 observations are presented in Table 8 in Appendix A, these are interpreted based on the 
information given in Austnes-Underhaug et. al. (2005), Nygaard and Skoland (2011) and 
Schiefloe et. al. (2005). 
 
 
 
 28 
After this accident in 2004, Statoil implemented fourteen initiatives as a result of 
investigations. Six of them were directly linked to technical relations at SNA and will not be 
presented here, the remaining eight were implemented in the entire Statoil Norway 
organisation and can therefore prove valuable when comparing to the results from GFC. The 
initiatives implemented were (Nygaard and Skoland 2011): 
 
1. Planning, risk reviews and management involvement regarding Drilling and Well 
(D&W) operations in Statoil – ensure quality in the planning process, new 
requirements. 
2. Competency on well control issues and barrier understanding in Statoil – Certification 
course and seminars focusing on previous events. 
3. Well integrity for Statoils wells on the Norwegian Continental Shelf (NCS) – review 
of all of Statoils wells 
4. Subsurface Support Centre in Technology and Projects D&W – competency and 
contact centre for D&W operations. 
5. Governing documents in Statoil – Simplification and training, clear definition between 
requirement and method. 
6. Management training for operational leaders – ensure that experiences from causal 
analysis is implemented in leader training. 
7. “The administrative workday” for operational leaders in Exploration and Production 
Norway (UPN) – redistribution of responsibility and reduce bureaucracy. 
8. HSE tools, systems and analysis in UPN – simplify reporting and enhance analysis in 
Synergi
5
. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
5
 Synergi: Statoils incident reporting tool 
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4.2. WELL CONTROL INCIDENT ON GFC 
 
Well C-06 AT5 was drilled using Managed Pressure Drilling (MPD)
6
 mode to total depth 
(TD) of 4800 mMD (measured depth). May 19
th
 2010, the final circulation and clean out of 
reservoir section resulted in a hole in the 13 3/8” casing with subsequent mud loss to 
formation. The 13 3/8” casing was a common barrier element; the hole in the casing therefore 
caused both the barriers to be lost. Due to the loss of backpressure, the exposed reservoir was 
allowed to flow into the well until the well was sealed at the 9 5/8” shoe due to packing off of 
debris or cuttings. This seal limited the flow of hydrocarbons into the well. During the first 24 
hours after incident occurrence, both the offshore and onshore organisation failed to 
understand and manage the complex situation. Almost two months were spent attempting to 
stabilize the well and re-establish well barriers (Talberg et.al. 2010). 
 
The well control incident resulted in 0,15 kg/s of gas leakage, loss of common barrier 
element, reputation challenges relating to coverage in national and international media, 
overall production loss of 1084 MNOK and 677 MNOK in material and other economic 
losses (Talberg et. al. 2010). 
 
The incident in its entirety is explained in Appendix B.  
 
Talberg et. al. (2010) identifies five triggering causes of the well control incident: 
 
1. Use of casing with inadequate technical integrity 
2. Monitoring control of pressure in C-annulus 
3. Margin between pore and fracture pressure 
4. Contingency procedures do not cover loss of common barrier element in a well control 
situation 
5. Drilling supervisor and tool pusher perform shift change at the same time 
                                                 
6
 Managed Pressure Drilling is a drilling method used when conventional methods are 
undesirable, for example when drilling through depleted reservoirs and fracture formations. 
The BHP is managed dynamically using backpressure and the mud weight is usually lower 
than the pore pressure, however overbalance with the reservoir is maintained by managing the 
backpressure in a closed return line using a choke valve. A closed system with good volume 
control allows for quick feedback from the well regarding losses or influx. During MPD 
operations, several barrier elements are common for both primary and secondary well barrier.  
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They also present in their report four underlying causes of the incident:  
 
1. Risk assessment related to casing as a common barrier element 
2. Risk assessment prior to start-up of MPD operations 
3. Risk assessment during MPD operations 
4. Inclusion of experiences from C-01 
 
 
63 observations are presented in Table 9 in Appendix B, these are interpreted based on the 
information given in Gundersen et. al. (2010), Nygaard and Skoland (2011) and Talberg et. al. 
(2010).  
 
As a result of the well control incident on GFC and criticism directed at Statoil for not 
learning from their mistakes (Nygaard and Skoland 2011), seven initiatives have been 
implemented in the Statoil Norway organisation (Statoil press release 2011):  
 
1. Strengthened safety culture through simplified steering system and reduced 
bureaucracy. 
2. Continue to develop Statoil as a robust organisation for safe and efficient operations 
by developing authority and leadership in the line.  
3. Enhance the practice of Statoils values7 through a more open and caring business 
culture.  
4. Continue to develop investigation as a central tool to secure learning from incidents in 
the company.  
5. Reduce the risk of major accidents in the company. 
6. Enhance and develop organisational learning within the company.  
7. Secure better learning and management of Statoils service and contractor companies.  
 
                                                 
7
 Statoil’s values: Courageous, Open, Hands-On and Caring (www.statoil.com) 
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5. ANALYSIS 
 
Table 6 shows the analysis from observation to HF for the blowout on SNA. The observation 
numbers correlate with the observations listed at the end of Appendix A. Chapter 6 shows the 
relationship between the explanation strengths of the HFs. Some of the observations have 
been translated into the same symbolic concept; these are listed as multiples in column one. 
The relationship between subclass of HF and HF is constant at 0.9 and is therefore not shown 
in Table 6 or Table 7 (analysis of well control incident on GFC).  
 
Table 6 - Analysis of the interpreted observations from the blowout on SNA, from observation to HF including 
relations. 
Obs. 
No. 
SYMBOLIC CONCEPT SUBCLASS OF 
HF 
HUMAN FACTOR 
1 Inadequate understanding of 
consequences of change 
0,9 Inadequate evaluation 
of change 
Organisational change 
2 Inadequate implementation 
of change 
0,7 Inadequate change 
process 
Organisational change 
3 Inadequate knowledge of 
change 
0,8 Poor quality of 
information 
Communication 
4 Inadequate follow-up of 
audit results 
0,7 Inadequate auditing Management and 
supervision 
5 Inadequate auditing methods 0,9 Inadequate auditing Management and 
supervision 
6 Lack of milestones in 
planning 
0,6 Inadequate planning 
procedure 
Procedures 
7  
10 
Planned with insufficient 
barriers 
0,8 Planning error Design error 
8 Consequences of plan 
alterations not analysed 
0,4 Inadequate task 
analysis 
Training and competence 
9 Inadequate use of previous 
experiences 
0,7 Inadequate 
application of 
information 
Communication 
11 Inadequate risk analysis 0,5 Lack of competence Training and competence 
12  
30  
36 
Inadequate compensating 
measures 
0,5 Inadequate safety 
procedure 
Procedures 
13 Inadequate management 
prioritization of peer assist 
0,9 Lack of management 
prioritization 
Management and 
supervision 
14 Inadequate documentation 0,6 Poor quality of 
information 
Communication 
15 Inadequate approval 0,3 Inadequate follow-up 
of operations 
Management and 
supervision 
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Obs. 
No. 
SYMBOLIC CONCEPT SUBCLASS OF 
HF 
HUMAN FACTOR 
16 Insufficient prioritization of 
risk assessment 
0,5 Safety culture Organisational culture 
17 Lack of use of previous 
experiences 
0,7 Inadequate 
application of 
information 
Communication 
18 Inadequate understanding of 
deviation processes 
0,4 Inadequate reporting 
procedure 
Procedures 
19 Inadequate understanding of 
terms 
0,4 Lack of procedural 
training 
Training and competence 
20 Inadequate approval of 
executed HAZOPs 
0,3 Inadequate follow-up 
of operations 
Management and 
supervision 
21 Inadequate safety 
communication 
0,9 Poor quality of 
communication 
Communication 
22 Inadequate use of previous 
experiences 
0,7 Inadequate 
application of 
information 
Communication 
23 Insufficient competency 
requirements 
0,8 Lack of competency Training and competence 
0,7 Inadequate resource 
management 
Management and 
supervision 
24 Inadequate use of essential 
resources in planning 
0,8 Lack of competence Training and competence 
25 Lack of installation specific 
competency 
0,9 Inadequate resource 
management 
Management and 
supervision 
0,8 Lack of competency Training and competence 
26 Unwillingness to use 
external expertise 
0,5 Safety culture Organisational culture 
 0,6 Lack of competency Training and competence 
27 Program engineer hired 
consultant 
0,8 Inadequate resource 
management 
Management and 
supervision 
28 Poor prioritization of 
resources from management 
0,8 Inadequate resource 
management 
Management and 
supervision 
29 Planning not prioritized 0,8 Safety culture Organisational culture 
31 Inadequate understanding of 
severity 
0,5 Inadequate follow-up 
of operations 
Management and 
supervision 
32 Inadequate of involvement 
of competent personnel 
0,8 Lack of competence Training and competence 
33 Inadequate understanding of 
planning procedures 
0,5 Lack of procedural 
training 
Training and competence 
34 Pressure testing not 
performed 
0,4 Lack of competence Training and competence 
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Obs. 
No. 
SYMBOLIC CONCEPT SUBCLASS OF 
HF 
HUMAN FACTOR 
35  
37 
Inadequate preparation for 
well control incident 
0,5 Planning error Design error 
38 Accident severity 
downgraded 
0,6 Lack of competency Training and competence 
39 Wrong contact information 
in procedures 
0,5 Inadequate safety 
procedure 
Procedures 
40  
42 
Lack of knowledge of 
communication lines 
0,7 Lack of procedural 
training 
Training and competence 
41 Inadequate alarm system 0,5 Equipment design 
error 
Design error 
42 Lack of knowledge of 
communication lines 
0,7 Lack of procedural 
training 
Training and competence 
43 Emergency personnel 
exposed to unnecessary 
danger 
0,8 External fatigue 
factors 
Fatigue 
44 Earlier start-up 0,7 Inadequate planning 
procedure 
Procedures 
45 High activity on installation 0,6 External fatigue 
factors 
Fatigue 
46 Rig unprepared for 
operations 
0,9 Planning error Design error 
47 Inadequate emergency 
response 
0,5 Lack of procedural 
training 
Training and competence 
48 PA messages inaudible 0,9 Equipment design 
error 
Design error 
49 Lack of understanding of 
risks 
0,4 Lack of competence Training and competence 
 
Based on the analysis completed in Table 6, Table 10 in Appendix C shows the explanation 
strengths per HF. These are further graphically presented in Chapter 6.  
 
Table 7 shows the same type of analysis as above, this time for the well control incident on 
GFC. This analysis is based on the 63 interpreted observations presented in Table 9 in 
Appendix B.  
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Table 7 - Analysis of interpreted observations from the well control incident on GFC, from interpreted observation to 
HF including relations. 
Obs. 
No. 
SYMBOLIC 
CONCEPT 
 SUBCLASS OF 
HF 
HUMAN FACTOR 
1 StatoilHydro merger (2007) 
resulted in personnel 
challenges 
0,9 Inadequate change 
process 
Organisational change 
2 Inadequate concequence 
analysis 
0,9 Inadequate change 
process 
Organisational change 
3 Inadequate technical 
understanding 
0,7 Lack of competence Training and competence 
4 GF organisation seen as 
rigid and difficult to manage 
0,9 Inflexible 
organisation 
Organisational culture 
5 Inadequate integration of 
governing systems 
0,8 Integrating HF 
(Safety Management 
Systems) 
Organisational change 
6 
 14  
50 
Inadequate compensating 
measures 
0,7 Inadequate safety 
procedure 
Procedures 
7 Planned with insufficient 
pressure margin 
0,6 Guiding safety 
principle 
Organisational culture 
8 
 9 
16 
43 
Inadequate risk analysis 0,5 Lack of competence Training and competence 
0,5 Inadequate safety 
procedure 
Procedures 
10 Inadequate distribution of 
staff 
0,4 Inadequate resource 
management 
Management and 
supervision 
11 Risk assessment group not 
composed of necessary 
expertise 
0,7 Inadequate 
competency 
Training and competence 
12 Inadequate assessment of 
analysis needs 
0,5 Lack of competence Training and competence 
13 Lack of understanding of 
complexity 
0,5 Lack of competence Training and competence 
15 Inattention to risk 0,5 Inadequate safety 
procedure 
Procedures 
17 ALARP principle not used 0,9 Inadequate safety 
procedure 
Procedures 
18 
22 
23 
47 
57 
Inadequate documentation 0,6 Poor quality of 
information 
Communication 
19 Lack of coherence between 
results and implementation 
0,4 Inadequate 
application of 
information 
Communication 
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Obs. 
No. 
SYMBOLIC 
CONCEPT 
 SUBCLASS OF 
HF 
HUMAN FACTOR 
20 
23 
30 
31 
Lack of use of previous 
experience 
0,7 Inadequate 
application of 
information 
Communication 
21 Inadequate approval 0,9 Inadequate follow-up 
of operations 
Management and 
supervision 
24 Lack of coherence in risk 
assessments 
0,7 Inadequate safety 
procedure 
Procedures 
0,5 Poor quality of 
communication 
Communication 
25 
26 
Lack of understanding of 
governing documents 
0,7 Lack of procedural 
training 
Training and competence 
27 Insufficient resource 
capacity 
0,7 Inadequate resource 
management 
Management and 
supervision 
 Simultaneous operations 0,5 External fatigue 
factors 
Fatigue 
28 Individual quality of work 0,7 Inadequate reporting 
procedure 
Procedures 
32 Lack of operational 
experience 
0,9 Lack of competence Training and competence 
33 Inadequate field specific 
experience 
0,7 Lack of competence Training and competence 
34 Lack of inclusion of field 
specific experience 
0,4 Inadequate resource 
management 
Management and 
supervision 
35 Inadequate use of Peer 
Review 
0,7 Safety culture Organisational culture 
36 Inadequate learning 
processes 
0,8 Safety culture Organisational culture 
37 Unwillingness to receive 
external assistance 
0,6 Inflexible 
organisation 
Organisational culture 
38 Inadequate inclusion of 
principle personnel 
0,7 Guiding safety 
principle 
Organisational culture 
39 Inadequate monitoring of 
formation 
0,6 Poor quality of 
information 
Communication 
40 Uninformed decision makers 0,5 Inadequate resource 
management 
Management and 
supervision 
41 Inadequate planning of 
alternative solutions 
0,8 Planning error Design error 
42 Insufficient operational 
planning 
0,7 Inadequate planning 
procedure 
Procedures 
44 Lack of operation related 
training 
0,7 Lack of procedural 
training 
Training and competence 
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Obs. 
No. 
SYMBOLIC 
CONCEPT 
 SUBCLASS OF 
HF 
HUMAN FACTOR 
45 Interdepartmental 
communication challenges 
0,7 Safety culture Organisational culture 
46 Inadequate understanding of 
key concepts 
0,5 Lack of procedural 
training 
Training and competence 
48 Inadequate supervision from 
management 
0,8 Inadequate follow-up 
of operations 
Management and 
supervision 
49 Actions implemented after 
SNA still not successful 
0,9 Inadequate change 
process 
Organisational change 
51 Inadequate kick margin 0,4 Inadequate safety 
procedure 
Procedure 
52 Inadequate pressure 
monitoring 
0,4 Inadequate safety 
procedure 
Procedures 
53 Inadequate shift change 
procedures 
0,9 Poor quality of 
communication 
Communication 
54 
55 
Continued operations 
despite complications 
0,7 Insufficient follow-up 
of operations 
Management and 
supervision 
56 MPD drillstring insufficient 0,8 Equipment design 
error 
Design error 
58 Inadequate risk 
communication 
0,7 Poor quality of 
communication 
Communication 
59 Lack of open culture 
addressing concerns 
0,8 Safety culture Organisational culture 
60 Inadequate pressure test 0,9 Planning error Design error 
61 Sheer ram not certified 0,7 Equipment design 
error 
Design error 
62 Inadequate emergency 
communication 
0,8 Poor quality of 
communication 
Communication 
63 Severity of situation 
underestimated 
0,4 Lack of competence Training and competence 
 
All the path strengths are summed up into explanation strengths, as per equation (2) and listed 
in Table 10 in Appendix C. Equation (3) shows how to transform the explanation strength 
from a number to a percentage, in order to compare them with each other.  
 
                     [ ]    
                                
                                        
        
(3) 
 
The graphical representation of the results based on the information in Table 10 are shown in 
Figure 8, presenting the explanation strengths for SNA and GFC separately as well as the 
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collectively per HF. Maintenance error has been omitted from the figures because its 
explanation strength equalled zero.  
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6. RESULTS 
 
 
The results in Figure 8 show that training and competence is the HF with the highest 
explanation strength, but it is not significantly higher compared to the other seven. In order to 
see whether it is possible to make a conclusion as to the human related root cause of these 
accidents (reference goal no. 1), breaking down the HF into their subclasses and looking at 
the explanation strengths of the subclasses separately may allow for more conclusive results.  
 
 
Figure 8 - Explanation strength per HF 
 
Figure 9, Figure 10 and Figure 11 on the following pages show the explanation strengths of 
each subclass. By breaking down the HF into their subclasses, lack of competence represents 
a majority of the observations made, with the highest explanation strength.  
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Figure 9 - Explanation Strength subclasses of HF – SNA 
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Figure 10 - Explanation Strength subclasses of HF – GFC 
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Figure 11 - Explanation Strength subclasses of HF - Collective 
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7. DISCUSSION 
 
The results are discussed by topic, both in relation to themselves as well as to previous work 
and, in terms of suggestions to improve the safety level of the organisation. The KM and the 
data used have their advantages and limitations, these are discussed and improvements are 
suggested. The discussions presented in the following chapter are the candidates’ own 
interpretations. These interpretations are based on the work done in the present thesis, 
chapters 1 through 6.  
BLOWOUT ON SNA 
 
The HF with the highest explanation strength after the analysis of the blowout on SNA is 
training and competence with 29%, followed by management and supervision with 22%. 
Added, these two HF represent 51% of the observations in the accident.  The HF with the 
third highest explanation strength is communication with 14%.  
 
When breaking down the HF, into their subclasses, and looking at the explanation strength 
here, lack of competence tops the list with 18%, followed by inadequate resource 
management and lack of procedural training at 10% and 9% respectively.  
 
As presented in chapter 4.1, Kjeldstad et. al. (2005) found three underlying causes of the 
accident which were human related. These included a lack of understanding of the 
consequences relating to altering plans, underestimation of complexity and risks involved and 
lack of understanding of the necessity of risk analyses and management. All three underlying 
causes coincide with the two HF with the highest explanation strength, they all relate to a lack 
of competence and management involvement.  
 
The initiatives implemented by Statoil as a result of this accident are also presented in chapter 
4.1. They show that four out of eight, i.e. half the initiatives are related to training and 
competency and three out of eight are related to management. This means that both the results 
and the initiatives presented in earlier work coincide with the analysis done using the KM.  
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WELL CONTROL INCIDENT ON GFC 
 
The analysis of the well control incident on GFC is less conclusive than for SNA. The 
explanation strengths are more evenly spread across the HF with training and competence in 
the lead with 19% followed by organisational culture and procedures at 17% and 16% 
respectively. The HF that differs from the others is fatigue with only 1%, otherwise the rest of 
the HF are within a 10% range. This makes concluding with a root cause more challenging. 
 
The same form of even distribution of explanation strengths is seen when breaking the HF 
into their subclasses. Here lack of competence has 14%, followed by inadequate safety 
procedure at 12% and safety culture at 9%.  
 
The results from GFC show that the GF organisation has challenges in all aspects of human 
error and that based on this; there is no distinctive root cause.  
 
The triggering and underlying causes of Talberg et. al. (2010) refer to inadequate contingency 
procedures, inadequate risk assessment and lack of inclusion of previous experiences. In this 
KM these underlying causes can be related to procedures, training and competence and 
communication. This partly coincides with the HF that is presented above as having the 
highest explanation strength. However, organisational culture is not referred to in that 
document as an underlying cause and yet in this analysis 17% of the observations were related 
to it. The reason why organisational culture is not addressed as an underlying cause may be 
due to the fact that it is a factor that is challenging to capture; it involves human attitudes and 
behaviour.  
 
The initiatives implemented by Statoil after SNA have, at the time of the GFC accident, six 
years later, still not resulted in the anticipated outcome. Lack of competence continues to pose 
as the largest challenge within the organisation. It may seem that Statoil is more concerned 
with presenting their plans, than learning from them and managing to permeate the entire 
organisation with these new changes. Their leaders and managers do not have the necessary 
knowledge to monitor and supervise changes and assure that they are implemented. They lack 
an open organisational culture. 
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Organisational culture may be the HF that is most difficult to change, however, in order to do 
so, the change has to start with management leading by example. If a well respected 
management initiates, the rest will follow, as long as they are included in the change process.  
 
  
COLLECTIVE 
 
When combining the results for SNA and GFC and looking at the collective analysis, training 
and competence has explanation strength of 24%, followed by management and supervision 
and communication summing up to 17% and 15% collectively. When breaking these results 
down into the subclasses of HF, lack of competence has explanation strength 16% whilst the 
rest of the subclasses are evenly distributed with explanation strengths ranging from 1% to 
8%.  
 
By taking the liberty of applying these results to the whole company, one can say that Statoil 
experiences challenges relating to the competency of their employees. The competence is 
available within the company, but using the correct knowledge and competence at the correct 
time seems to pose challenging.  
 
Statoils management should focus on implementing and follow-up initiatives, which decrease 
the competency challenge. With increased competency comes increased understanding of 
complexities and the need for risk assessments. By completing the necessary and 
comprehensive risk assessments, resulting in the correct compensating measures, many 
incidents can be averted. By averting smaller incidents, the probability of these developing to 
major accidents is limited.  
 
The work to increase competency levels within the organisation, should, based on 
observations start by addressing the following areas:  
 Risk evaluation and risk assessments 
 Management and organisational development 
 Process and procedural development 
 Safety culture 
 Responsibility and management in crisis situations 
 Crisis management 
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Accidents combined with IPT Knowledge Model, may be used as a tool in procedural 
training.  
 
QUALITY ASSURANCE OF MODEL AND DATA 
 
The IPT KM gives a numerical value to where the main challenge within the company lies. It 
gives management an indicator into how to prioritize organisational changes in the future. 
However, the results are prone to bias by the investigator. The investigators background and 
experience affects the results; it is their interpretation of the information available that results 
in observations. The only predetermined relation is the one between subclass of HF and HF 
(0.9). The investigator determines the relation between symbolic concept and subclass of HF 
as they see best fit. There are no statistics available that can give the relation as shown in 
Table 2 and therefore the results can have a large variation depending on who the investigator 
is. This is one of the strengths of the model, giving a probable relation where mathematical or 
statistical relations are lacking. Once the mathematical or statistical relations exist, the 
relations can be updated. This gives more reliable results.  
 
As stated earlier, this model is continually under development, and at this point still in the 
early phase regarding major accidents. This gives the investigator leeway regarding how to 
apply the model to a given accident. This is both positive and negative as it allows the 
investigator to analyse according to the given accident and not a set of rules and regulations; 
at the same time this results in a wide range of results depending on the investigator.  
 
Thunem et. al. (2009) stated that there is a lack of consensus in the industry as to what 
organisational dimensions that are relevant to address. Setting maintenance error aside (has 
not been addressed in the present thesis), this model has presented eight HF that, based on the 
analysis, show that every observation has its place. When looking at the results, it may be up 
to discussion whether the HF fatigue should be its own indicator or whether the subclasses 
here should be placed under one of the other HFs. For example, the subclass of fatigue, 
external fatigue factors that includes pressure to deliver within a time frame could also be a 
subclass of management and supervision or organisational culture.  
 
Hernæs (2012) applied the same model to the blowout on SNA and the results there showed 
that almost 50% of the observations were related to procedures. When comparing the results 
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from the specialisation project and the present thesis, there is significant variation in the 
results. In the present thesis, 9% of the observations were related to procedures. This shows 
that the same investigator can have variations in their conclusions. The KM used in the 
specialisation project was a simplified version of the one applied here, creating uncertain 
results. In the analysis shown above the investigator has a greater knowledge of the model and 
the steps in which to perform it.  
 
It is challenging for the investigator to set an observation in relation to just one or two human 
factors. Many HF are related and observations can fit just as well into one as to another, 
depending on how the investigator chooses to translate it into a symbolic concept.  
 
Engineers are familiar with numbers and statistics and tend to prefer precise and tangible data. 
This model gives a more technical approach to the accident resulting in numerical values. 
Based on the results it may be easier to present them to an organisation of engineers, giving 
them a better understanding of the challenges at hand and where the work needs to be done 
than by merely listing what went wrong. This is the main difference between this model and 
other models. Other models, as presented in chapter 2.2, do not conclude numerically.   
 
Human behaviour is irrational and challenging to give numerical values to. The work started 
with the IPT KM is a step in the right direction in order to quantify human behaviour.  
 
As this model is bottom-up modelling, the more it is applied to accidents the better it becomes 
and the conclusions will be strengthened. The model still needs development before it can be 
used as the main tool of accident investigation, equivalent to for example MTO-analysis. 
However, when the KM is commercially marketed, it will give more tangible results than its 
peers.  
 
The field data applied in the present thesis is limited to the investigation reports by Statoil, 
PSA and IRIS. The analysis performed was therefore a complementary analysis based on the 
investigations of these three organisations. The investigator here is biased before the analysis 
started due to the conclusions presented in these reports. This may have affected the results.  
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The KM has never been applied to an accident where there have not been previous 
investigations and it would be interesting to the see how the model would function based on 
unbiased data collected directly from the source by the investigator.   
 
Statoil has made changes to their internal reporting systems and also their team site functions 
after the blowout on SNA as well as the merger with Hydro in 2007. This means that, since 
GFC is the more recent of the two accidents, more information is available; this could have an 
effect on the number of observations for the two accidents.  
 
This model should be applied to a number of accidents and calibrated for NCS. Unfortunately 
for the model, but fortunately for the industry, there have not been enough accidents of this 
calibre in the past 10 years in order to do so. This results in a limited applicable data set.  
 
SUGGESTED IMPROVEMENTS 
 
In order to diminish the effect of the investigators bias, it will be beneficial to have several 
investigators working separately with an analysis and then meeting to compare results and 
discuss the observations and path strengths/explanation strengths. This will give a more 
comprehensive analysis than when there is just one investigator. Putting together an 
investigative team that consists of both technical and HF experts will give the best results. A 
review of the organisational indicators and subclasses, where duplicity is eliminated, the 
model will give more precise results and will also decrease the interpretation from the 
investigator.  
 
A dataset of statistics relating common symbolic concepts with subclasses will allow for a 
greater similarity between each analysis. However, when relating to human error, it is 
challenging to set everything into predetermined boxes, as humans are not necessarily as 
simple as this. The challenge here is to make it complex enough for a sound conclusion and 
also flexible enough to highlight new areas.  
 
To ensure a proper understanding of how this model works and apply it to an accident it is 
important that the investigator has training in how to use it. Experience with the model and 
procedural training are both efficient ways of ensuring this. Chapter 2.4 suggests that the 
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necessity for training regarding the use of this model is at novice level. This is still viable as 
the model itself can be used without much experience, but the more knowledge one has of it 
and the more one has applied it, the more reliable the results become. This is also applicable 
for anything in life, the more experience and training you have, the better you get.  
 
In order to ensure the quality of the KM, the model must be applied to an accident that has not 
been investigated previously and the data is therefore raw data directly from the source. This 
may give better or different observations and therefore a more direct conclusion based solely 
on this accident. The next step for this model is for an investigative organisation, for example 
PSA, to implement this model into their work and in this way improve the model.  
 
Since accidents of this calibre are a rarity, it will be necessary to apply the model to smaller 
incidents and discrepancies in order to create a more comprehensive model.  
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8. CONCLUSION 
 
On basis of the work done in present thesis the following statements can be made; 
 
Analysis and Results: 
 Training and competency was indicated as the root cause of the two accidents, with 
subclass lack of competence as the major contributor.  
  Management and supervision have also been indicated as having an effect on 
incidents and accidents within the company.  
 By increasing the competency levels within the company and ensure that the leaders 
and management have the proper tools to follow-up their employees, one can improve 
the safety levels.  
 Management lack the necessary knowledge to monitor and supervise changes, 
assuring that they are implemented. This results in inadequate change management 
and thus the inability to learn from previous accidents. An open organisational culture 
resulting in an improved safety culture will create the learning environment necessary 
to prevent the next major accident.  
 
The Model: 
 An adapted version of the IPT KM has been applied to the two accidents in question in 
order to find the root cause. Observations interpreted from investigation reports have 
been used as input parameters in the model. The final results show the explanation 
strengths per HF and the explanation strength per subclass of HF.  
 The adapted model implemented a new HF, management and supervision. This proved 
to be a valuable HF, without proper resource management and follow-up of 
operations, the employees are allowed to continue as they see fit.  
 
The Data: 
 The data used was based on investigation reports using other accident investigation 
models, the data was therefore biased and this may have had an effect on the outcome.  
 Engineers are familiar with numbers and statistics and tend to prefer precise and 
tangible data. This model results in numerical values that may be easier to present to 
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an organisation of engineers, giving them a better understanding of the challenges 
within the company.  
 
Future improvements: 
 The calculations to the explanation strength and thus the root cause of the given 
accidents are in large part prone to bias from the investigator. The results do coincide 
with previous published work, but by reducing the effect of investigator bias, the 
results can prove to be more conclusive.  
 For future work, the data must be collected directly from the source without subjective 
thoughts from a third party.  
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ABBREVIATIONS 
 
ALARP As Low As Reasonably Possible 
APOS Arbeids- og Prosessorientert Styring 
BHA Bottom Hole Assembly 
BHP Bottom Hole Pressure 
BOP Blowout Preventer 
BRF Basic Risk Factors 
BU Bottoms Up 
CF Contributing Factors 
CTA Cognitive Task Analysis 
D&W Drilling and Well 
DBR Daily Drilling Report  
DOP Detailed Operations Plan 
ECD Equivalent circulating density 
EPN Exploration and Production Norway 
FTA Fault Tree Analysis 
FWR Final Well Report 
GF Gullfaks 
GFC Gullfaks C 
Gp Group (geological) 
HAZID Hazard Identification 
HAZOP Hazard and Operability Analysis 
HF Human Factor 
HMI Human-Machine Interaction 
HPES Human Performance Evaluation System 
HRS Hovedredningssentralen 
HSE Health, Safety and Environment 
ICMA International Crisis Management Association  
IRIS International Research Institute of Stavanger 
KM Knowledge Model 
LOT Leak off test 
MD Measured Depth 
MORT Management Oversight Risk Tree 
MPD Managed Pressure Drilling 
MPO Managed Pressure Operations 
MTO Man-Technology-Organisation 
NTNU Norwegian University of Science and Technology 
P&A Plugged and Abandoned 
PA Public Announcement 
PETEK Petroleum Technology 
POB Personnel on board 
POOH Pull Out Of Hole 
PSA Petroleum Safety Authority 
RCA Root Cause Analysis 
SNA Snorre A 
SOL Safety through Organisational Learning 
STEP Sequentially Timed Event Plotting 
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TD Total Depth 
TG Trip Gas 
TNE Technology and New Energy 
USIT UltraSonic Imaging Tool 
WCI Well Complexity Index 
WHP Wellhead Pressure 
XLOT Extended Leak Off Test 
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Appendix A. BLOWOUT ON SNA 
 
Complete sequence of events 
 
The blowout as presented in its entirety below is extracted from Austnes-Underhaug et. al. 
(2005) investigation report.  
 
History 
 
From start of operations in 1992 Saga Petroleum ASA was the operator on SNA until Norsk 
Hydro AS acquired operatorship on the 1
st
 January 2000 and after that Statoil on 1 January 
2003.  
 
Two underground production facilities are linked to the installation, which is a tension leg 
platform.  
 
In the years prior to the blowout there had been high activity on the platform and at the time 
of the blowout, drilling operations, well intervention and set-up of new well intervention 
tower were being performed on the platform. 
 
The blowout on SNA occurred on the 28 November 2004 and in the months prior to the 
blowout SNA had changed drilling entrepreneur from ProSafe to Odfjell Drilling. Odfjell 
Drilling did acquire 80% of ProSafes crew on board, however, several of the crew members 
on board were new to the installation as well as this was the first rotation for Statoils Drilling 
Supervisor.  
 
Well P-31 was drilled as an observation well in 1994; the purpose of this well was to collect 
geological data to optimize the well trajectory and the wells horizontal section. The sidetrack 
P-31 A was drilled and completed during spring 1995. P-31 A was originally planned as a 
production well, but was converted in the beginning of 1996 to an injection well for alternate 
injection of water and gas (WAG) and was primarily used as a gas injector until shutin in 
December 2003.  
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Several issues were encountered when drilling this well and as a result of these the well was 
graded as a complex well. Factors influencing this were due to reduced integrity as a result of 
corrosion and leakages, the unconventional well completion using a lot of small completion 
elements.  
 
Planning of operations: Slot recovery 
 
The operation that resulted in a blowout in November 2004 was a slot recovery operation to 
prepare the well for drilling sidetrack P-31B.  
 
Planning for the slot recovery started 17
th
 June 2004. To start the process, well history 
information and Statoil governing documents were collected.  
 
The original plan for slot recovery was finished in September 2004 and had considered the 
wells integrity issues. This plan stated that the reservoir section should not be tampered with; 
this meant the reservoir should not be opened and cemented. This plan was according to 
recommendations from Statoils HQ as of August 2004.  
 
In October 2004, the slot recovery plan was altered due to recommendations from the 
reservoir SNA RESU (REServoarUndersøkelse = reservoar investigation) team, which was 
the task force put together for slot recovery purposes. The new plan was to pressure cement 
the reservoir section in order to avoid communication between the reservoir in P-31A and the 
new planned sidetrack P-31B. Communication between P-31A and P-31B could lead to poor 
oil recovery as well as unpredictable/unwanted flow patterns. Drilling and well department of 
SNA RESU were sceptical to this alteration in the plan due to the fact that it would further 
complicate the plan and execution of it during slot recovery. However, by the end of October 
2004, drilling and well SNA RESU agreed to implement the changes in the revised plan.   
 
The decision was made to alter the sequence of the original plan which was to first cut and 
pull the 5 ½” production tubing prior to puncturing the tail pipe. By puncturing the tail pipe 
prior to cutting and pulling the production tubing they could avoid a transition zone between 9 
5/8” casing and 5 ½” production tubing, which could show to be problematic for entry with 
puncture tools.  
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This plan was risk evaluated concerning the holes in the 9 5/8” casing without any major risk 
or barrier concerns were identified.  
 
During the last formal planning meeting on the 11
th
 November 2004 both service providers 
and personell from SNA RESU were present. During this meeting, the wells history was 
presented as well as presentations and discussions pertaining to every aspect of the each 
suboperation. A peer assist and risk meeting was planned on the 12
th
 November, but cancelled 
due to scheduling, and there was therefore never held a proper risk review of the operations 
plan. 
 
Between 15
th
 -16
th 
November the plan was verified and approved by SNA RESU management 
and the following operations were approved:  
 
1) Puncturing of tail pipe 
2) Bullheading of OBM to replace brine 
3) Cutting and pulling of 5 ½” production tubing 
4) Cutting and pulling of 7 5/8” scab-liner 
5) Cementing of reservoir section 
6) Cutting and pulling of 9 5/8” casing.  
 
It was during operation (4) that the blowout occurred.  
 
Operations on P-32 ended earlier than expected, as a result of this the rig was skidded and the 
slot recovery on P-31B commenced.  
 
The previously delayed peer assist risk review was set to be held on the 19
th
 November 2004 
and was cancelled.  
 
Operations 
 
On November 19
th
 2004, slot recovery operations on well P-31A commenced. Already early 
in the slot recovery operation at sub-operation number 3) Cutting and pulling of 5 ½” 
production tubing well control issues were experienced in operations on the 21
st
 November. 
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Mud kicked in to the well containing diesel and gas. This issue was quickly rectified and 
investigated internally in Statoil.   
 
The operation of puncturing the 2 7/8” tail pipe allowed for reservoir pressure communication 
with wellbore pressure as well as contact with hydrocarbon bearing layers in the reservoir. At 
this point, the primary barrier in the well was 1.47 sg brine and then bullheaded to 1.47 sg 
OBM.   
 
When pulling out the 5 ½” tubing, studies showed that the tubing had only partly been cut and 
when pulling the tubing, the lower part of the tubing with 4” straddle were also being pulled. 
The rig was not prepared for this sort of pulling operation and the tools on board were not 
sufficient to pull this through the BOP.  
 
The onshore service provider had a substantial waiting period before managing to get the 
tools offshore and therefore other solutions was considered. It was considered to run in hole 
with the lower part of 5 ½” tubing and the 4” straddle back into the well.  
 
E-mail correspondence between drilling supervisor offshore and program engineer onshore on 
the 24
th
 November regarding a deviation application for pulling of 7 5/8” scab-liner without 
BOP rams was responded to by the program engineer stating that he had interpreted that this 
was not necessary as long as the liner being pulled was not in open hole.  
 
The following day a meeting between the program engineer and the leading drilling engineer 
in TO RESU (acting supervisor). The agenda for the meeting was to discuss pressure 
cementing of the reservoir section. As a result of this meeting the plan was revised so that 
they would puncture a hole in the top of the scab-liner prior to cutting. The purpose of this 
would be to equalize for potential gas and pressure behind the scab-liner.  
 
This suggestion was implemented in a revised DOP offshore. Risk evaluation of  pulling 
scab-liner through BOP was removed from the DOP as a result of previously mentioned e-
mail correspondence.  
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On 25 November, HAZOPs were completed for two of the sub-operations by the onshore 
crew. The first was approved and signed by SNA RESU management. The second, however, 
was never approved or signed by management.  
 
The scab-liner was punctured on the 27
th
 November, after waiting for an hour to observe the 
well for gas, the crew continued to cut and pull the liner hanger. After this, the operation of 
pulling the scab-liner out through the PBR commenced.  
 
According to the DOP, the drilling crew were to expect a u-tube effect due to brine in the 
annulus behind the scab-liner giving a pressure increase of 32 bar in the mud system, 
however, this effect was not observed, but the crew continued to observe the well periodically 
for volume changes. Later investigations showed that the reason no u-tube effect had been 
observed was because the casing spear that connected the drillstring and the scab-liner had no 
or faulty seal.  
 
Later that evening swabbing was observed for the first time. In the first part of a pulling 
operation swabbing is consider normal. The scab-liner was then, as a compensatory measure 
to the swabbing, pulled slowly and periodical observations of the well were made.  
 
On the night of the 28
th
 November the scab-liner had been pulled up to under the BOP and the 
well was flow-checked prior to pulling the liner through the BOP, the well showed no signs of 
volume changes. The crew continued pulling the scab-liner through the BOP, blind and shear 
rams now blocked due to the scab-liner. Swabbing was observed and also mud losses 
occurred. During this operation the well was periodically flow checked and observed. After 
each flow check the well was determined stable and pulling proceeded.  
 
During this operation there was continuous communication between the drilling supervisor, 
Offshore Installation Manager (OIM) and operations manager onshore about the development 
in the well.  
 
 
During the discussions mentioned above, the involved personnel only discuss the actual sub-
operation and not the affect these may have on later sub-operations.  
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Well control situation development 
 
At 15.30 on the 28
th
 November the annulus safety valve on the BOP was closed for the first 
time, as a result of the swabbing. After a short period of pressure buildup in the well, losses 
occurred.  
 
The progressive issues with the well were the main concern on the installation management 
meeting at 17.00 and the scheduled emergency preparedness drill was cancelled. At about 
18.00, after an attempt was made to reverse circulate the well, backflow of well fluids was 
observed, developing in an unwanted direction. 
 
In order to gain control of the situation, at 19.00 mud reserves were established with 250m
3 
OBM. Neither the shear ram, pipe ram nor kelly cock were accessible. The Kelly cock was 
covered by the skirts around the top drive and was therefore not operable. In order to put in a 
kill stand with internal BOP on a pressurized system the Kelly cock must be able to close.  
 
The offshore installation manager called for an emergency meeting at 19.05 between himself, 
operations manager, production supervisor and safety manager. During this meeting, the 
decision was taken to mobilise the emergency response management to the emergency 
response centre. They were mobilised using a silent alarm.  
 
At 19.14, gas was detected in the cooling water returns on the Vigdis subsea processing 
systems compressors. This was assumed to be an internal leak in the system and without 
further investigation of the cause of the gas detection the gas detectors were turned off in 
order to avoid the main power being shut down. The production from both Snorre and Vigdis 
subsea processing plants was stopped.  
 
As a result of the undefined situation considering well P-31A and all the insecurities 
surrounding it, the offshore installation manager demanded manual process shut down at 
19.30. All non-essential crew, all crew not involved in mitigation of the situation, mustered to 
the lifeboats. According to standard procedure, the following were alerted of the situation on 
board: emergency response vessel (Ocean Knarr) and helicopters (on Oseberg and Statfjord 
B), Statoils command centre at Forus, Rescue coordination centre at Sola (HRS) and PSA. 
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A transcript of the control rooms incident log shows that gas was detected in several modules: 
W07, W11, P17 and P18.  Gas had seeped through the annular preventer in the BOP and out 
by the bell nipple.  
 
At 20.42, 72 minutes after mustering to lifeboats the evacuation plan and the persons on board 
list was ready, 47 minutes later than SNAs performance requirement. Evacuation plan was 
completed after discussion with pilots regarding wind direction and safety of helicopter 
evacuation.   
 
Between 20.58 and 22.05 the primary phase of the helo-evacuation completed and the crew 
was now reduced from 216 to 75 crewmembers. Amongst the evacuated crew were also 
SNAs ROV operators and this decision caused the ROV to be inaccessible on board. The 
remaining 75 crew members still on board were the drilling personnel included in the killing 
operation, emergency response management in the emergency response centre as well as 
emergency response teams which occupied lifeboat #1 in order for quick evacuation or in case 
they were needed.  
 
There were not many options for killing the well at this point. The only possible well control 
action that could be taken was to pump mud both through the drillstring med scab-liner and/or 
down through the annulus. The pressure in the drillstring and the annulus is reduced from 130 
bar to 10 bar and 80 bar to 4 bar respectively until 21.00. The skirts around the top drive were 
dismantled and the Kelly cock was closed at 21.10. 
 
Gas was detected on the exterior of module F11 at 21.20 and several external gas detectors 
went off in the vicinity of F11 in the minutes that followed. When crewmembers were sent to 
inspect the area in question they reported back to the emergency response management that 
the ocean was “boiling” with gas, emergency shutdown (NAS 2) was activated manually; this 
also results in a main power shutdown. The installation was now operating on emergency 
power supply which means that large portions of the installation was without power in order 
to remove sources of ignition. The emergency shutdown process NAS 2 also causes shutdown 
of ventilation, overpressure and negative pressure, the fire pumps also start automatically 
when NAS 2 is activated.  
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For the first time at 21.38, full evacuation of the installation with lifeboat drops was 
considered as a result of gas to sea.  
 
After NAS 2, low firewater pressure in ring pipes south, east and north was ascertained. Three 
different common alarms from three different dire pumps were registered in the control rooms 
alarm list. The shut down of the main power also resulted in a false alarm on the smoke 
detection unit in the ROV container.  
 
Due to the blowout of gas from the seafloor possibly causing loss of buoyancy and stability of 
the installation a control room operator was set to continually keep an eye on the tension force 
in each leg. The official reports state that no change in tensile force was observed on any of 
the legs.  
 
At 21.25, drilling module also started to run on emergency power. This resulted in decreased 
efficiency of the well control operations due to substantially reduced power supply to 
drawworks, rotation of drillstring and mud pumps. Until midnight they were unable to 
achieve sufficient pump rates to counteract the influx.  
 
Several alternative solutions were now being discussed in order to regain control of the well, 
among these were complete cementing of the well. The cement pumps run on diesel engines 
and are therefore independent of the main power supply. This operation, however, posed a 
safety threat due to the fact that the diesel engine and cement module is ventilated by taking 
in air from underneath the installation and this could potentially lead to suction of gas into the 
cement module and diesel engine. Actions were implemented in order to reverse the intake of 
air for the diesel engine.   
 
At approximately 21.45 a short recess in the helo-evacuation was taken whilst evaluating the 
possibility of gas on the helo-deck. Due to favourable wind direction and conditions it was 
concluded that helo-evacuation could continue.  
 
Manual pressure relief of the well commenced at 21.50. 
 
At 22.45 the decision was made to restart the main power supply in order to achieve enough 
power to continue with the killing operation. When this decision was made the emergency 
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response management had two options, either to fully evacuate the installation or to turn the 
main power supply back on. At this point gas had not been detected since 21.33, which was 
the basis for the decision. However, the emergency response management still looked at this 
action as critical.  
 
The vessel Normand Mjølne was in the vicinity of SNA and set in high alert with regards to 
FIFI-emergency response (fire-fighting) together with another vessel, Ocean Knarr. FIFI-
emergency response entails that the vessels kept there main engines running so that the time 
taken to get full effect of the FIFI-monitors was reduced from 12-14 minutes to 2-3 minutes to 
ensure a short response time in case the gas was to ignite.  
 
The crew which had mustered to lifeboat #1 from 19.30 were given the opportunity to collect 
warm blankets and so on, they were also affected by the high noise generated by the fire 
pumps and emergency generators which made it difficult to hear the PA messages in the 
lifeboat. At 22.50 the crew was moved to lifeboat #4 after observations of a lot of gas in the 
sea beneath lifeboat #1.  
 
The critical operation of rebooting the main power supply commenced at 23.52. 
Simultaneously, the wind direction changed due west and diminished so that by midnight 
there was almost no wind. For the second time this night SNA was again prepared for quick 
evacuation of personnel and requested high helicopter response alert.  
 
Statoil request an expanded safety zone from Ptil. The safety zone is now expanded to a 
radius of 2000m and height of 3000ft.  
 
When the main power supply had been shutdown the ventilation had done the same, this 
meant that the local supply rooms were without ventilated air and the doors had been kept 
open to avoid overheating. Some of the rooms also lost their overpressure protection. The 
remaining crew on-board did rounds to monitor these areas.  
 
Between 01.25 and 01.30 another 40 crewmembers were evacuated in 3 helo-lifts. The team, 
which had been waiting in lifeboat #4, was now evacuated after 6 hours in a lifeboat. There 
was at this point now only 35 people left on-board the installation.  
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At 01.00 OBM was bullheaded into the well and pressure decrease was observed until 02.30, 
at this time there was no more pre-mixed OBM mud left, including the reserves. The drilling 
crew mixed another 80m
3
 of OBM between 02.30 and 04.00, since the reserves were empty 
the only action they could do whilst mixing mud was to observe the well. The pressure 
increased to 120bar inside the drillstring and 84bar in the annulus.  
 
A confirmation of the extinguished flare was logged at 03.15.  
 
By 03.30 the wind had once again changed direction to south/south-west and forces increased 
to 17-10knots.  
 
80 m
3 
OBM was confirmed mixed at 0400 and was bullheaded into the well until the reserves 
were once again empty. After 0530 there was no more OBM left on board and due to the gas 
conditions in the sea and in the vicinity of the installation, supply vessels with mud were not 
an option. At this time the following pressure readings were recorded: 32 bar inside the 
drillstring and 55 bar in the annulus.  
 
Several possible actions were discussed and considered: Cementing, use of seawater or 
mixing of emergency mud using the additives available on the installation. The decision was 
made to go for the latter option and water based mud (WBM) was mixed using water, barite 
and bentonite. Between 0400 and 0915 the crew mixed 160m
3
 WBM having a specific 
density of 1.8, whilst continually observing the well.  
 
The emergency response management saw this operation using WBM as the final attempt to 
stop the influx into the well. The purpose of waiting prior to starting bullheading, using 
WBM, was that it was desirable to have sufficient volumes of WBM during this last attempt.  
 
Prior to starting the bullheading operation with WBM at 0900 a heightened evacuation 
response was for a 3
rd
 time requested from the installation.  
 
The pressures recorded prior to bullheading with WBM were 156 bar in the drillstring and 72 
bar in the annulus. Bullheading started and at 1022 the crew confirmed 0bar pressure in the 
drillstring and 0bar pressure in the annulus. At this point only 8-10m
3
 WBM was left in the 
tanks.  
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Observations 
 
 
Table 8 - Observations SNA interpreted during the present thesis from Austnes-Underhaug (2005), Nygaard and 
Skoland (2011) and Schiefloe et. al. (2005).  
No. OBSERVATION 
1 Operatorship changed from Hydro to Statoil in 2003 - altering operating 
philosophy and steering documentation 
2 Establishing a functioning RESU unit has been time consuming 
3 Implementation of Tampen RESU unit has caused confusion in the Snorre 
organisation 
4 Deviation between audit (2004) and planning of P-31 A 
5 Method used in internal audits do not reveal insufficient compliance with 
governing documents 
6 Milestones during planning not according to governing documents 
7 Planned with insufficient barriers 
8 Consequences of alterations in plans not analysed 
9 Inadequate experience transfer related to well integrity 
10 Planned with inadequate well barrier during cutting of scab-liner 
11 Pulling of scab-liner planned without consideration to the overall risks 
involved 
12 Compensating measures not implemented with regards to blocking BOP in 
open position 
13 Inadequate management involvement with respect to prioritization of peer 
assist 
14 Approval routines not according to governing documents 
15 Signature page not in compliance with governing documents 
16 Overall risk evaluation meeting cancelled during planning 
17 Inadequate experience transfer regarding previous incidents 
18 Inadequate understanding of  deviation processes 
19 Lack of understanding related to terms used in governing documents 
20 Inadequate approval of executed HAZOPs 
21 Result of HAZOPs not communicated to executing crew 
22 Previous incidents not taken into consideration in risk assessments regarding 
swabbing 
23 Insufficient job description and responsibilities  
24 Drilling contractor not involved in planning of operations 
25 Statoil changed drilling contractor short time prior to the accident, several 
personnel new to the installation as well as Statoils own drilling supervisor 
26 Working methods do not include implementing competency from principal 
environments in the organisation 
27 Program engineer was a hired consultant left to plan mainly for himself  
28 Poor prioritization of resources from management 
29 Low prioritization of planning meetings from involved personnel 
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No. OBSERVATION 
30 Compensating measures not implemented regarding securing the secondary 
barrier after puncturing tailpipe 
31 Stop of operation not initiated as a result of insufficient barrier status, 
communication with reservoir. 
32 Principal personnel do not evaluate the overall risk of altering program 
33 Risk contributions taken out of DOP 
34 Pressure testing of secondary barrier not performed 
35 Preparation for a well control incident not according to drilling contractors 
"golden rule" 
36 Compensating measures not implemented when pulling scab-liner through 
BOP 
37 Kelly cock valve blocked when well control incident developed and annulus 
valve in BOP was closed 
38 Accident severity downgraded by onshore management, later upgraded to 
severity RED 
39 Communication issues between emergency preparedness line 2 and PSA due 
to wrong telephone number 
40 Statoil unaware of who to contact regarding expanded safety zone 
41 ROV container experienced several smoke alarms, false alarms as a result of 
the container being classified as temporary despite being onboard for several 
years 
42 Offshore emergency personnel contacted directly by PSA and HRS, this 
communication should have gone through line 2 
43 Emergency personnel exposed to unnecessary danger while sitting in lifeboat 
#1 for 6 hours 
44 Startup of operations initiated earlier than planned 
45 High activity on installation at time of accident 
46 Rig unprepared for pulling operation 
47 ROV operators evacuated 
48 Crew on lifeboat #1 unable to hear messages given on PA due to external 
noise 
49 Drilling management offshore underestimated the risks involved and a risk 
assessment was not completed prior to each activity/DOP 
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Appendix B. WELL CONTROL INCIDENT ON GFC 
 
Complete sequence of events 
 
The well control incident as presented in its entirety below is extracted from Talberg et. al. 
(2010) investigation report.  
 
History 
 
Well C-06 was drilled in 1991. In 2008 production seized and the well was plugged back in 
2009 in order to drill the sidetrack C-06A. C-06 is a well without gastight threads in 13 3/8” 
casing, as well as poor cement towards the 20 “ casing. Hydrocarbons have been present in 
the B- and C- annulus.  
 
September 30
th
 2009 the drilling program for conventional drilling of C-06A is approved with 
the following main risks: 
 Drilling in to high pressure zone 
 Unable to get 9 5/8” x 10 ¾” extension tubing to planned depth 
 Small window between pore and fracture pressure 
 Unexpected pore pressure, undrillable well and unplanned mobilization of MPD 
 Difficulty regarding good cement job on 7” tubing 
 
During November 2009, well C-06 is plugged and abandoned (P&A) and pore pressure at the 
top of the Shetland group was measured at 1,72 s.g. A USIT-log was run and the 13 3/8” 
casing and cement evaluated. The results of the USIT log showed 14% general wear 
throughout the casing, variable cement bond quality behind the 13 3/8” casing, dislocation of 
logging tool between 1420 and 1430 mMD indicating possibly larger wear in this area.  
 
Operations 
 
Drilling of 12 ¼” x 13 ½” section in well C-06A commences. The plan is to stop drilling and 
set the 9 5/8” casing far enough above the high-pressure zone in the Shetland Gp. On 
December 23
rd
 the well experiences a kick as well as loss of mud to formation. The kick came 
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from the Lista formation, with pore pressure above 1,70 s.g. The formation at the 13 3/8” shoe 
leaks off at 1,68 s.g. whilst the prognosed fracture pressure  was at 1,85 s.g. As a result of this 
incident a compensatory action is to execute an XLOT in order to find the minor horizontal 
stress.  
 
On December 28
th
 this incident is classified as severity Red level 1 (actual), however, it is not 
investigated according to regulations for such a classification. It is classified as qualitatively 
red and HSE-wise yellow.  
 
By the end of January 2010 the well is secured by setting cement and mechanical plug inside 
the 9 5/8” liner. Due to the incident the 10 ¾” x 9 5/8” liner was set at 2427 mMD compared 
to planned depth of 2704 mMD. Planning of the further operations on C-06A starts.  
 
Conventional drilling on C-06A resumes on March 1
st
, with a smaller drilling window than 
previously assumed. After the incident stated above the maximum pore pressure has increased 
from 1,72 s.g. in the Shetland formation to 1,73 s.g. in the Lista formation. Estimated fracture 
pressure is now 1,83 s.g. at the 9 5/8” shoe.  
 
Drilling of C-06A ceases on March 9
th
 whilst drilling of C-06AT2 commences. 
 
Three days later C-06 AT2 is plugged back as a result of losses while drilling out of shoe. 
Total lost is 85 m
3
 mud with a mud weight of 1,72 s.g. at the 9 5/8” shoe.  
 
An XLOT performed at 2420 m MD on March 13
th
 shows 1,79 s.g. in reopening pressure, 
which is lower than the 1,83 s.g. prognosed formation strength. Drilling starts on C-06 AT3 
using a 8 ½” x 9 ½” BHA before drilling is ceased on March 19th and fractures caused by the 
XLOT are cemented.  
 
Between March 13
th
 to 20
th
 alternative solutions are considered, due to the new pressure 
prognoses, and the decision is made to continue drilling using MPD techniques. This decision 
is made without regarding the effect this change to the operation will have on the drilling 
program or risk register is documented or approved. The transition from conventional drilling 
to MPD implies the following alterations:  
 New drilling method (MPD) 
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 New requirements due to common barrier elements 
 Altered conditions regarding relief well 
 New safety margins 
 Change in kick margin 
 New requirements regarding training 
 
The decision to drill a 2300 m long reservoir section is made with the following starting point:  
 MPD operations are to be executed using 1,52 s.g. mud, approximately 42 bar back 
pressure and maximum allowed variation in well pressure of  2,5 bar.  
 Conventional part of operation to be executed using 1,75 s.g. mud.  
 
At this point the highest pore pressure in the well is 1,73 s.g. (1740 mTVD) and measured 
fracture pressure is 1,79 s.g. (1644 mTVD), this implies that:  
 The MPD-operation has a margin of  0,85 bar towards losses and influx, as well as 
the presupposed operational window of  2,5 bar.  
 Requirements to margins against kicks for the conventional part of the MPD 
operation, which is 4 m
3
 in a 8 ½” hole, are not met.  
The static mud weight of 1,52 s.g. is lower than the prognosed collapse pressure of the 
formation (1,55 s.g.) 
 
The Final Well Report (FWR) for well C-01 including MPD operational experience is at this 
point not prepared and the experiences/learnings are not available.  
 
When starting to drill C-06 AT4 on March 20
th
 losses of 8 m
3
 are experienced as well as an 
influx of 440 litres during an hour.  
 
A successful pressure test is executed on March 24
th 
of the 13 3/8” and 10 ¾” x 9 5/8” casings 
to 83 bar for 10 minutes. In accordance with best practice in the Statoil organisation, it is 
applied for a dispensation from requirements regarding two independent barriers in the 
crossover from conventional to MPD operations. It is sought for dispensation despite the fact 
that there is acceptance in APOS for a common barrier element during MPD operations.  
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Rig up of the MPD equipment starts on March 23
rd
 by Halliburton. The dispensation 
application is approved on March 31
st
 with the risk assessments presented. Casing and cement 
as a common barrier element is not included in these assessments.  
 
Another successful pressure test of 13 3/8” casing and 9 5/8” x 10 ¾” liner to 83 bar for 10 
minutes is executed on April 5
th
, as well as successful inflow test in MPD mode using 1,52 
s.g. WARP mud.  
 
Trip gas of 7,3% is experienced whilst circulating bottoms up (BU) at 2360 mMD on April 
7
th
.  
 
On the following day, April 8
th
, the wellhead pressure (WHP) is set at 119 bar (295 bar 
standpipe pressure (SPP)), most likely due to operating error.  
 
Drilling out of the cement is finished on April 13
th
 and ready to sidetrack C-06 AT4. 82 m
3
 
have now been lost since April 11
th
.  
 
C-06 AT5 is drilled in MPD-mode starting on April 13
th
. Five days later on the morning of 
April 19
th
 trip gas of 7,1% is experienced, increasing the target ECD to 1,77 s.g. which again 
results in even more gas (TG=9,5%), this effect is referred to as ballooning
8
. The ballooning 
effect indicates that the well cannot withstand the target ECD of 1,77 s.g. A draw-down test is 
executed later that day in the Lista formation at 2664 mMD showing a pore pressure of 1,73 
s.g. This coincides with the previously assumed pore pressure.  
 
During the time period from April 22
nd
 to the 29
th
 a pressure increase in the C-annulus occurs 
from 12 to 18 bar resulting in a weakened barrier envelope. C-annulus pressure is normally 
registered once every 24 hours by production operator, however, this pressure increase is not 
detected.  
 
                                                 
8
 A phenomenon in which fluids are lost to the rock during over-pressured operations, such as 
found in increased pressures from equivalent circulating density operations, and then flow 
back when pressure is reduced. This may be confused with a kick (SPE E&P glossary 2012). 
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The well experiences underbalance on April 22
nd
 whilst changing the PCD packing element 
due to leakage through stripper annular. This does not allow the well to stay within the  2,5 
bar margin.  
 
Whilst changing the PCD packing element on April 24
th
, the volume on the trip tank is 
increased, the stripper annular is leaking and the WHP decreases from 43,34 to 5,71 bar 
(underbalance). Gas is circulated out of the well.  
 
Despite the fact that the issues related to the PCD packer element causes underbalance in the 
well, operations proceed as planned without implementing sufficient compensatory measures.  
 
Between April 30
th
 and May 1
st
 the well is displaced to 1,75 s.g. prior to POOH. A kick is 
experienced (350 litre) with consequent well control situation when pulling drillstring out of 
hole. This incident is registered in Synergi with severity Yellow level 3 (Possible). Operations 
continue without implementing compensatory measures.  
 
Another increase in the C-annulus occurs between May 10
th
 and 18
th
 from 12 to 20 bar again 
weakening the barrier envelope. The pressure change is not detected.  
 
During the period from May 5
th
 to the 19
th
 the is drilled to TD (4800 mMD) with periodical 
challenges with both the well and tools experienced: 
 Change of PCD packer element with simultaneous leakage in stripper annular 
 Problems regarding backpressure, feeding and cement pumps 
 Uncertainty whether the hole opener has worked 
 Several incidents of loss and influx 
 Periods of underbalance 
 Leakage in mud system and difficulties shearing mud.  
 
Well control situation development 
 
The well control incident that occurred on well C-06 AT5 happened on May 19
th
 2010.  
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At 11:39 the suction pressure is lost on the back pressure pump as well as all other pumps 
used in operation. The MPD-choke pressure decreases from 45 to 33 bar at 12:32 
(underbalance in the well for 8 minutes) and then increases to 43 bar. Due to changing of the 
PCD packer element the drillstring is pulled off bottom and is now standing with the BHA in 
a shale zone.  
 
Between 12:23 and 13:14 the well is shut in using the rig annular, whilst the back pressure 
pump is being repaired.  
 
At 13:32, using the cement pumps, 800 lpm is pumped into the well with 800 lpm in return. 
14 minutes later at 13:46 the back pressure decreases from 45 to 13 bar over the MPD choke 
and it is no longer a possible to maintain the back pressure. This occurs in conjunction with 
pulling the PCD packer element. 800 lpm are pumped without returns over the MPD choke 
confirming loss to formation. At this point, one of the wells common barrier elements is 
broken. The 20” shoe loses its integrity and fluids are injected into the formation. 13 bar + 
1,52 s.g. static coincide with LOT at 20” shoe.  
 
The backpressure stabilizes at 13 bar after 20” shoe is broken. The well is losing mud, taking 
influx from the reservoir and the drillstring is possibly packed off. The mud weigh (1,52 s.g.) 
plus 13 bar is lower than the pore pressure in the Lista formation and Shetland Gp.  
 
There is here an incident with potential for underground blowout that baffles both the on- and 
offshore crew.  
 
From 13:57 the rigs BOP is closed using annular preventer and efforts are being made 
towards the demanding well control incident with underbalanced mud in the hole, which the 
crew is not prepared to handle.  
 
From 15:57 gas is detected in the mud processing area with consequent automatic general 
alarm and mustering. POB is OK after 23 minutes, meeting the 25 min requirement.  
 
Vaktsentralen is alerted by crew on GFC who, according to procedure, alert line 2. During the 
following conversation between emergency response leader on GFC and emergency response 
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manager line 2 the emergency response leader perceives the conclusion to be that line 2 are to 
muster, whilst line 2 understands that this is not necessary at this point.   
 
Between 16:19 and 18:41 the north and south shaft on GFC are shut down.  
 
New gas detection takes place in the mud processing and drilling area at 17:51 with automatic 
initiation of general alarm.  
 
From 19:15 to 19:27 the south shaft is again up and running without the crew being aware of 
the pressure build up in the C-annulus, this has now increased from 20 to 38 bar from May 
18
th
 to the 20
th
. No pressures are read on May 19
th
.  
 
At 20:00 an attempt is made to pull the drillstring. The drillstring is stuck with the bit at 4573 
mMD.  
 
The following day, May 20
th
, the organisation is made aware of the pressure increase in the 
C-annulus, this has been read at 05:00 showing 38 bar.  
 
Production is shut down from 18:13 to 21:03 and personnel without emergency preparedness 
tasks are demobilized. D&W establish an emergency preparedness organisation onshore.  
 
The first cement plug is set on May 31
st
 between 3290 and 4573 mMD in order to isolate the 
reservoir from the Shetland Gp. 
 
Cement plug number two is set on June 7
th
 to stop the flow from the Lista formation and 
Shetland Gp into the well, it is set inside shoe until 9 5/8” liner at 2427 mMD.  
 
A hole in the 13 3/8” casing from 1408 to 1420 mMD is localised on July 10th. Cement plug 
number three is set on top of the mechanical plug (set at 2043 mMD) between 1848 to 2043 
mMD.  
 
On July 14
th
 a 10 ¾” tieback is installed, sealing the hole in the 13 3/8” casing against the 
well. The well barriers are re-established and the normalisation phase is ceased.  
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Observations 
 
Table 9 - Observations GFC interpreted during the present thesis from Gundersen et. al. (2010), Nygaard and 
Skoland (2011) and Talberg et. al. (2010).  
No. OBSERVATION 
1 Merger between Statoil and Hydro in 2007 created many personnel 
challenges, including harmonizing work processes and governing documents 
2 Access to installation specific competency lacking as a result of the 58+ exit 
package 
3 Management underestimated the technological complexity of GF field 
4 GF organisation is seen as rigid and difficult to manage, do things their own 
way without consideration of governing documents 
5 Complex governing documents when integrating DocMap and APOS 
6 Contingency plans do not cover loss of common barrier element in a well 
control incident 
7 Planned with insufficient pressure margin  
8 Inadequate risk evaluation regarding use of 13 3/8" casing with inadequate 
technical integrity 
9 Risk assessments not completed according to governing documents 
10 Risk coordinator not appointed in compliance with governing documents 
11 Risk assessment group not composed of necessary expertise 
12 The need for different analyzes had not been assessed. (Ex. HAZID, HAZOP, 
impact study etc.) 
13 Risk reviews conducted did not reflect the wells complexity and risk category 
14 Higher levels of risk definition efforts in relation to the high WCI were not 
implemented 
15 Well planned as a standard well without increased attention to risks associated 
with altering the plan or incidents during operations 
16 Inadequate risk assessment regarding corresponding well drilled using MPD 
techniques (C-01) 
17 Risk analyses were not completed and risk reducing measures implemented 
according to ALARP principles 
18 Risk register did not reflect the risk analyses and discussions in the planning 
group 
19 Risks related to circulation of heavy fluids/cement did not reflect the results 
from simulations 
20 Experiences related to kicks/losses while pulling out during MPO were not 
included in the risk review 
21 Assessment and approval of rest risks in the risk register (yellow and red risks) 
were not signed according to governing documents on several accounts 
22 Risk register did not include all the minimum information requirements. 
23 Most documentation from risk review lack list of participants according to 
governing documents 
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No. OBSERVATION 
24 Drilling of 8 1/2" hole and cementing of 7" liner were treated in several 
documents in the risk register, however with different risks identified and 
different evaluation of the risks identified 
25 Planning personnel not aware of requirements regarding process related to 
execution of risk reviews 
26 Planning personnel unclear as to who was required to be present/involved in 
risk analysis - risks analyses executed without involving principal personnel 
27 Insufficient capacity in the organisation to plan both conventional and MPD 
operations simultaneously prior to start up of operations 
28 Individual reporting in DBR regarding quality of reporting. Insufficient in 
instances regarding collecting experiences from previous incidents/operations 
29 Lack of evaluation of previous experiences relating to the possibility of higher 
pressure above Shetland 
30 Lack of evaluation of experiences relating to kicks in wells B-30 and A-36 
31 Experiences regarding poor cement in previous wells were not addressed  
32 Lack of operational experience with MPOs in the planning organisation 
33 Involved personnel had relatively short experience with the Gullfaks field 
34 Personnel with operational experience regarding MPOs on Gullfaks were not 
involved in planning 
35 Inadequate use of peer assist/Peer Review in conjunction with planning 
36 Learning processes, including "workshops", were not used during planning 
37 Gullfaks organisation chose not to utilize competence outside their 
organisation despite principal personnel on well integrity and MPOs had 
offered their assistance 
38 The MPD principal community in Statoil were in a small or to no degree 
involved prior to the final stage where it was decided to used MPD techniques 
39 Pressure development in Shetland/above Shetland was inadequately monitored 
regarding the development of good and precise pressure prognoses 
40 MPD community were not involved in PETEKs decision regarding drillability 
or classification of wells drilled using MPD techniques 
41 MPD was not planned as an actual alternative for the majority of the planning 
phase 
42 Elements relating to well execution were insufficiently examined prior to 
operations 
43 Risk analysis did not compensate for the complexity of primary barrier and 
challenges relating to common barrier element. Alternatives relating to loss of 
barriers were not planned for 
44 Requirement regarding competence related to MPOs were not implemented. 
Very few of involved personnel had taken the required e-learning courses, 
safety training and simulator training 
45 Planning department experienced communication issues between principal 
personnel within GF and MPD competent personnel in TNE 
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No. OBSERVATION 
46 General insecurity about the definition of key concepts in governing 
documents 
47 Inadequate documentation of decisions and basis for them, including method 
choice and risk assessments 
48 Lack of compliance with requirements related to managements job 
description. This includes requirements seeing to that the operation is planned 
and executed according to company requirements, HSE policy and strategy 
49 Statoil still has challenges relating to the companys ability to involve 
necessary principal personnel during planning and risk assessment even after 
putting in a lot of work into bettering the situation after blowout on SNA 
50 The existing plan for relief well at the time of operations start-up could not 
have been used if needed looking at the formation conditions 
51 Calculated kick margin of 2,4 m3 does not comply with requirement for kick-
margin for MPD which is 1 m3 
52 Lack of monitoring and control of C-annulus pressure 
53 Drilling supervisor and tool pusher perform shift change at the same time 
54 Continued operation despite complications with PCD equipment 
55 Continued operations despite experiencing kick 
56 Drillstring used in MPD operations was not checked out according to 
governing documents relating to well integrity 
57 Change log not updated or signed according to governing documents, unable 
to read from the log whether the changes were implemented or not  
58 Responsible personnel were not made aware of the results, conclusions and 
recommendations following the assessment after loss of well control in the 
well during December 2009 
59 Several people thought that the incident in December 2009 should have been 
investigated more thoroughly 
60 Lower pressure than pore pressure during inflow tests after having observed a 
pore pressure of 1,73 s.g. during a previous inflow test further up in the well 
61 Shear ram not certified according to cutting of the drillstring being used 
62 Miscommunication between drilling supervisor and on-duty staff manager line 
2 regarding mustering of the emergency preparedness organisation 
63 Severity of the situation underestimated by line 2 organisation 
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Appendix C. RESULTS TABLES 
 
 
Table 10 - Explanation strength HF 
 SNA  GFC  COLLECTIVE 
Procedures 2,43 9 % 4,95 16 % 7,38 12 % 
Organisational 
culture 
1,62 6 % 5,22 17 % 6,84 11 % 
Organisational 
change 
1,44 5 % 3,15 10 % 4,59 8 % 
Design error 3,24 12 % 2,88 9 % 6,12 10 % 
Management and 
supervision 
6,12 22 % 3,96 13 % 10,08 17 % 
Training and 
competence 
8,01 29 % 6,12 19 % 14,13 24 % 
Communication 3,96 14 % 4,68 15 % 8,64 15 % 
Fatigue 1,26 4 % 0,45 1 % 1,71 3 % 
Total 28,08  31,41  59,49  
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Table 11 - Explanation strength per subclass [%] 
 SNA GFC COLLECTIVE 
PROCEDURES    
Inadequate planning procedure 4 % 2 % 3 % 
Inadequate safety procedure 3 % 12 % 8 % 
Inadequate reporting procedure 1 % 2 % 2 % 
ORGANISATIONAL CULTURE    
Safety culture 6 % 9 % 7 % 
Guiding safety principle 0 % 4 % 2 % 
Inflexible organisation 0 % 4 % 2 % 
ORGANISATIONAL CHANGE    
Inadequate change process 2 % 8 % 5 % 
Integrating HF 0 % 2 % 1 % 
Inadequate evaluation of change 3 % 0 % 1 % 
DESIGN ERROR    
Planning error 7 % 5 % 6 % 
Equipment design error 4 % 4 % 4 % 
MANAGEMENT AND SUPERVISION    
Lack of management prioritization 3 % 0 % 1 % 
Inadequate auditing 5 % 0 % 2 % 
Inadequate follow-up of operations 4 % 7 % 5 % 
Inadequate resource management 10 % 6 % 8 % 
TRAINING AND COMPETENCE    
Lack of competence 18 % 14 % 16 % 
Lack of procedural training 9 % 5 % 7 % 
Inadequate task analysis 1 % 0 % 1 % 
COMMUNICATION     
Poor quality of information 4 % 3 % 4 % 
Poor quality of communication 3 % 8 % 6 % 
Inadequate application of information 7 % 3 % 5 % 
FATIGUE    
External fatigue factors 4 % 1 % 3 % 
Personal fatigue factors 0 % 0 % 0 % 
 
